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 VALUING  RESIDUAL  GOODWILL  AFTER
TRADEMARK  FORFEITURE
Jake Linford*
Trademarks contribute to an efficient market by helping consumers find products they like
from sources they trust.  This information-transmission function of trademarks can be upset if the
law fails to reflect both how trademark owners communicate through marks and how consumers
understand and use them.  But many of trademark law’s forfeiture mechanisms (the ways a
trademark can lose protection) ignore or discount consumer perception.  This failure threatens
not only to increase consumer search costs and consumer confusion, but also to distort markets.
For example, trademark protection may be forfeited when the mark owner interrupts or aban-
dons use, even though consumers still see the mark as identifying products from that owner.  Or a
mark may be forfeited if the mark owner licenses the mark for use without following certain
quality control requirements, even if there is no evidence that licensees produce subpar products or
disappoint consumers.  As a result, a new seller can adopt a forfeited mark to identify its own
products, even when many consumers will be confused by that use.  If consumers think forfeited
marks often identify products from the original mark owner, widespread reuse of forfeited marks
can disrupt the ability of trademarks to transmit useful information to consumers.
Trademark forfeiture mechanisms operate like information-forcing penalty default rules, but
failure to account for consumer perception renders the information that they force incomplete.
Those mechanisms should be readjusted to account for residual consumer goodwill—the likeli-
hood that consumers reasonably associate a forfeited mark with the original owner.  This Article
proposes a framework for revealing and valuing residual consumer goodwill, and in the process,
restores needed balance to trademark’s forfeiture mechanisms as new entrants jockey for market
position by appropriating residual goodwill.
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INTRODUCTION
Coca-Cola Co. sold a fruit-flavored, highly caffeinated soft drink under
the Surge trademark from 1996 to 2003.1  After Coca-Cola discontinued
1 Coca-Cola Co.’s registration of Surge for soft drinks was cancelled in 2005 for failure
to file an acceptable Section 8 Declaration of Continued Use.  SURGE, Registration No.
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Surge, fans of the beverage bought billboards and started social media cam-
paigns hoping to convince the bottler to bring the beverage back.2  The cam-
paign worked: following a trial run through Amazon.com,3 Coca-Cola
relaunched Surge in several eastern states on September 7, 2015.4
Coca-Cola is lucky, however, that the twelve-year gap in sales was not fatal
to its rights.  In fact, it was a close call: two different firms filed applications
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) stating an intent to use
Surge as a trademark for beverages.5  In a hypothetical fight between the
soda giant and the upstarts, Coca-Cola’s decade of nonuse would provide
prima facie evidence that the company abandoned the Surge mark and thus
forfeited its trademark rights.6  Had either firm brought its planned beverage
to market prior to 2014, that firm would have secured superior rights in
Surge7 and thus the ability to keep Coca-Cola’s relaunch off the market.8
Some mark owners are not as lucky as Coca-Cola.  Abandonment
derailed a relaunch of the Stratotone line of guitars.9  Stratotone was one of
the lines formerly offered by the Harmony Company, which was perhaps the
largest musical instrument manufacturer in the United States in the mid-
twentieth century.10  Multitudes of aspiring rockstars in the ’50s and ’60s
2,186,269 (cancelled June 4, 2005) (use-based registration of Surge for “soft drinks, and
syrups and concentrates for use in the preparation of soft drinks”).
2 Jay Moye, SURGE Returns: Back by Popular Demand, Brand Now Available Exclusively on
Amazon.com, COCA-COLA COMPANY (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/
stories/surge-returns-back-by-popular-demand-brand-now-available-exclusively-on-
amazoncom/.
3 Id.
4 SURGE, https://www.surge.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
5 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/028,522 (abandoned Feb. 27, 2015)
(ITU application for Surge design mark for energy drinks and soft drinks); U.S. Trade-
mark Application Serial No. 85/040,311 (abandoned Aug. 4, 2014) (ITU application for
Surge for soft drinks); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/450,786 (abandoned Jan.
13, 2009) (ITU application for Surge for energy drinks).
6 Under the current version of the Lanham Act, three years of nonuse is prima facie
evidence of abandonment.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012), “abandoned”.  The mark owner may
rebut the presumption of abandonment with evidence that it intends to resume use, or
had a good reason for suspending use.  Specht v. Google Inc., 747 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir.
2014).
7 Agler v. Westheimer Corp., 143 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771 (N.D. Ind. 2015); see also Sut-
ton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
8 Appropriating firms often succeed in establishing abandonment and then acquiring
priority in the forfeited mark. See, e.g., Ziebarth v. Del Taco, LLC, Cancellation No.
92053501 (T.T.A.B. 2015) (successful challenge by Christian Ziebarth, securing an order
cancelling Del Taco’s registration of NAUGLES for Mexican restaurants [NAUGLES,
Registration No. 1,043,729] on the basis of abandonment); Strategic Marks, LLC v. Kellogg
N. Am. Co., Cancellation No. 92058181 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (successful challenge by Ellia Kas-
soff to Kellogg’s registration of the mark HYDROX for cookies [HYDROX, Registration
No. 4,874,933] due to abandonment).
9 Agler, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74.
10 According to the company, Harmony was the largest maker of guitars in the world
by 1965.  Mary Breslin, Keeping America in Harmony: Guitar Maker Brought Music to the Masses,
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played Stratotone guitars, as did a few bona fide legends: Ritchie Valens
started out on a Stratotone.11  But sales of Harmony guitars tailed off in late
2002.12  Charles Subecz sought to reinvigorate the brand and purchased sev-
eral marks for guitars once belonging to Harmony.13  Subecz then set out to
relaunch a line of new Harmony guitars with vintage aesthetics, including an
updated Stratotone.14  Subecz’s relaunch required an “archaeological dig
through company history,” as well as painstaking efforts to recreate tradi-
tional molds and reproduce classic Stratotone peripherals.15  The hard work
appeared to pay off: fans flocked to Subecz’s Stratotone as an authentic take
on the original.16
In 2009, shortly after Subecz’s relaunch of Stratotone, Westheimer Cor-
poration purchased all Harmony assets and goodwill from Subecz, including
his interest in any protectable marks.17  Westheimer also brought Harmony’s
former international sales manager on board to provide some continuity
between the new Harmony and the predecessor in interest.18
But, unbeknownst to Westheimer and Subecz, an enterprising luthier
shot the gap between the end of licensed Stratotone sales in 2002 and
Subecz’s 2008 relaunch.  In March 2006, Darryl Agler filed an intent-to-use
application to register Stratotone as a trademark for guitars.19  With the sale
of his first Stratotone guitar in 2010 and the completion of some paperwork,
Agler secured a registration in the mark with an effective priority date of
March 7, 2006.20  Agler’s earlier intent-to-use application, coupled with sales
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 22, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-03-22/features/
9201260476_1_harmony-instruments-music.  At one point, Harmony may have produced
1,000 guitars per day. HARMONY GUITARS, THE PEOPLE’S GUITAR, http://har-
mony.rothguitar.com/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).  Whether or not that is true, Harmony
guitars were starter instruments for many famous American musicians.
11 Born at NAMM: First Time Exhibitors Explain How the Show Serves as a Launching Pad for
New Enterprises, MUSIC TRADES, Mar. 2008, at 154 [hereinafter Born at NAMM].
12 Agler, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 772.
15 Reintroducing the Harmony Guitar Line: Harmony, the World’s Most Popular Guitar Brand
for Close to a Century, Is Coming Back with a Faithful Reissue of the Famous Ritchie Valens Model,
MUSIC TRADES 140, Feb. 2008, at 140.
16 Born at NAMM, supra note 11, at 156.
17 Agler, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
18 Breslin, supra note 10; Michael Ross, Gear Test Drive: Harmony H49 Jupiter Stratotone,
GUITAR PLAYER, Feb. 2012, at 114.
19 STRATOTONE, Registration No. 3,986,754 (“[F]or: musical instruments, namely,
guitars.”).
20 Id. Under section (b)(1) of the Lanham Act, a party may apply for registration
based on a bona fide intent to use the trademark.  15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) (2012).  If the
party first uses the mark in commerce within the statutory window, the party secures prior-
ity from the date of the initial intent-to-use application. Id. §§ 1051(d), 1057(c); WarnerVi-
sion Entm’t Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1996); Jake Linford,
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 703, 755 (2013) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse Possessor].
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starting after Subecz’s first sale, gave Agler prior rights against Westheimer.21
Subecz’s painstaking recreation of the Harmony line, Westheimer’s decision
to bring a former Harmony employee on board, and consumer interest in
the Harmony relaunch were all to no avail.
One might imagine that a court could look at the consumer affection for
Coca-Cola’s Surge and conclude, in light of that residual consumer goodwill,
that a mark like Surge should not be forfeited.  Or a court might compare
the quality and characteristics of the Subecz and Agler Stratotone offerings
against Harmony’s original Stratotone line to determine whether consumers
are likely to be confused or disappointed.  But courts do not ask these ques-
tions in abandonment cases.
The standard abandonment inquiry focuses on mark owner behavior
while ignoring consumer perception.22  Courts inquire whether the mark
owner has an excuse for suspending performance or a bona fide intent to
resume use.23  But courts discount evidence of residual consumer goodwill—
the perception of a substantial number of consumers that the mark still signi-
fies goods and services from the original mark owner.24
21 Agler, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 774.
22 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
23 Grocery Outlet Inc. v. Albertson’s Inc., 497 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).  The requisite intent is intent to resume a commercial level of use. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995); 3 J. THOMAS MCCAR-
THY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:11 (3d ed. 2008).
24 Goodwill is a mutable term and somewhat problematic to define.  Goodwill may
simply be a shorthand for the property right in the mark, a term for property that properly
packs in consumer perception, the intangible assets gained when one company acquires
another, or a measure of consumer perception independent of the mark owner’s property.
In this Article, I use consumer goodwill to indicate the value that consumers invest in the
mark, i.e., its value as a source signifier to reduce consumer search costs.
As one nineteenth-century court opined, goodwill is value that represents confidence
on the part of consumers “that their experience in the future will be as satisfactory as it has
been in the past,” earned by the mark owner through long years of “scrupulous” attention
to detail and care in maintaining “the standard of the goods dealt in.”  Washburn v. Nat’l
Wall-Paper Co., 81 F. 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1897).  The court in Washburn describes this goodwill
as “an element of value quite as important—in some cases, perhaps, far more important—
than the plant or machinery with which the business is carried on.” Id.  While some courts
and scholars refer to goodwill as a property right held by the mark owner as a reward for its
productive effort, goodwill cannot be separated from consumer perception.  Elizabeth Cut-
ter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection”: Control of Quality and Dilu-
tion—Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 73–74 (1990) (“[Goodwill] exists in
the minds of the buying public, where buyers trust the constancy of quality emanating
from a particular producer.  ‘Goodwill’ thus becomes ‘a business value [that] reflects the
basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller [whose] goods and ser-
vices . . . the customer likes and has found adequate to fulfill his needs.’” (alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:8(A) (2d ed. 1984))).  Goodwill is built both on objective
reasons (this soda is sweeter, this towel is more absorbent) and “emotional freight” (self-
image, fond memories).  Anne B. Fisher, Coke’s Brand-Loyalty Lesson, FORTUNE (Aug. 5,
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As with abandonment,25 other forfeiture mechanisms also use mark
owner behavior as the sole factor in determining whether the owner forfeits
rights in the mark.26  But ignoring how consumers perceive and use the
ostensibly forfeited mark disconnects the law from how trademark meaning
is generated and developed.27  To the extent they ignore consumer percep-
tion, these mechanisms deviate from trademark law’s professed goal of
preventing consumer confusion and reducing consumer search costs.28  This
is unfortunate, because when a mark is forfeited, the former mark owner is
not the only one who loses out.  Consumers who use the mark as a signal of
consistent source and quality also lose their investment in the mark as a
source signifier.29
When a new firm appropriates a forfeited mark, it stands to acquire con-
sumer interest and loyalty through behavior that, but for the forfeiture,
would constitute confusing and therefore infringing use.  Such a windfall to
1985), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1985/08/05/
66245/index.htm.
25 It is easy to confuse abandonment as a general term with abandonment as a specific
term for forfeiture through nonuse.  This Article thus refers to the mechanisms that can
end trademark protection as “forfeiture mechanisms,” and the specific loss of trademark
protection as a consequence of nonuse as “abandonment through nonuse” or simply
“abandonment.”
26 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . .
any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission,
causes the mark to become the generic name for the [marked] goods or services.”).
27 See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1423 (2005) (suggesting that a trademark’s
meaning depends on consumer interpretation).
28 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Death of Common Sense] (trademarks are
justified to the extent they “communicate useful information to consumers, and thereby
reduce consumer search costs”).  That commitment to consumer use is embodied in the
validity requirement that the mark owner establish source significance (also known as sec-
ondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness) for descriptive trademarks, product design
trade dress, and color marks, i.e., evidence that consumers use the mark, design, or symbol
as a source signifier.  Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 728–29.  That commit-
ment is also evidenced by the assumption underlying protection of suggestive, arbitrary,
and fanciful marks from first use, without evidence of source significance, because consum-
ers are highly likely to see those marks as source signifying.  Jake Linford, Are Trademarks
Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. L.J. 731, 740–41 (2017) [hereinafter Linford, Fanciful?]; Jake Lin-
ford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367,
1376–77 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, False Dichotomy].
29 One might hope that some form of notification or disclaimer on the label might
sufficiently warn consumers of the new owner and prevent otherwise-likely confusion.
Courts and scholars have expressed skepticism on this point. See, e.g., Suncoast Tours, Inc.
v. Lambert Grp., Inc., No. 98-5627, 1999 WL 1034683, at *5 n.4 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 1999)
(finding a substantial amount of consumer confusion was likely to persist even though
defendant sent letters to plaintiff’s former customers disavowing any connection); Jake
Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” Trademarks, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110,
167–68 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, “Generic” Trademarks] (explaining the limits of dis-
claimers for correcting consumer confusion).
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the appropriating firm is not inherently problematic in isolation, but it often
comes from the pockets of confused consumers.30  A consumer exposed to a
product offered by a new seller under a forfeited mark may be predisposed to
buy the product because of this residual goodwill, and disappointed when
the new product fails to meet expectations.31
Apologists argue that in the forfeiture context, maximizing competition
takes priority over preventing consumer confusion.32  But allowing a for-
feited mark with residual goodwill to be appropriated by a new entrant also
imposes costs on competitors who must overcome the advantage that residual
goodwill confers on the new entrant.  Forfeiture and appropriation of
residual consumer goodwill can thus disrupt the information-transmission
function of a trademark in ways that increase consumer search costs and
intensify consumer confusion,33 perhaps to the detriment of the trademark
ecosystem as a whole.
Previous critiques typically discussed forfeiture mechanisms in isolation
and thus failed to fully recognize the conflicting presumptions on which the
mechanisms are based.  This Article fills that gap by providing a stronger
normative account of the importance of consumer perception to the trade-
mark ecosystem, grounded on language-use and property-signaling theories.
Trademark meaning may start with the mark owner, but collective use by
consumers in context cements source significance in the commercial lexicon.
In addition, scholars have recognized the importance of examining property
claims in light of how signs of ownership are interpreted and reflected by the
interpretive community.  Trademark forfeiture mechanisms should likewise
reflect the key role of consumers in establishing trademark meaning.
Courts can provide a needed corrective, readjusting trademark forfei-
ture mechanisms to better protect those consumers who continue to rely on
a forfeited mark as a source signifier.  While courts often resist the invitation,
they can and should read the statutory language governing forfeiture mecha-
nisms to allow inquiry into residual consumer goodwill.  Courts can thus
ensure that trademark forfeiture mechanisms operate consistent with three
key objectives of trademark protection: reducing consumer search costs,
30 Indeed, consumers contribute significantly to trademark meaning. See, e.g., Steven
Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1 (1999) (“By associating a
symbol with an object, the public contributes to the authorship of trademarks.”).
31 In this Article, “product” indicates goods, services, or both.
32 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on
Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 355 (2007) (arguing that the
abandonment mechanism “prioritizes free competition over avoiding consumer confusion.
The goal is not to protect consumers, but to create bright lines so that producers will know
what marks are free to use”).
33 Robert Bone first used “information transmission” to label the proper function of
trademarks in the market.  Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, Hunting
Goodwill] (“[T]he ‘information transmission model’ . . . views trademarks as devices for
communicating information to the market and sees the goal of trademark law as prevent-
ing others from using similar marks to deceive or confuse consumers.”).
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encouraging mark owner investment in consistent quality, and maintaining a
proper competitive environment.34  To that end, the Article proposes a com-
prehensive set of factors to analyze whether a mark retains residual goodwill
and whether forfeiture is likely to harm consumers by dissipating consumer
investment of goodwill.  That framework will not only help judges uncover
relevant residual goodwill, but will also cabin the exercise of judicial discre-
tion in cases where the potential for residual goodwill is highly salient, but
the real effect of the goodwill is inconsequential.
It is possible, however, that judicial inquiry will unearth evidence of
residual goodwill too slowly.  An auction mechanism might uncover that
information more quickly and more completely.  The Article describes an
auction devised to improve discovery and valuation of residual goodwill.  In
addition, the auction is designed to increase the likelihood that the winner
will meet consumer expectations about the product(s) offered under the
mark.
This Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I briefly describes the forfeiture
mechanisms that can strip protection from a trademark: generislide, aban-
donment through nonuse, modification, assignment in gross, and naked
licensing.  Excepting generislide, these mechanisms largely ignore the role of
consumers in shaping trademark meaning.  Part II provides a more fully the-
orized account of this role; language-use and property-signaling theories
identify the importance of collective consumer use and perception to estab-
lish meaning and manifest property claims.  Part III explains how appropria-
tion of residual goodwill can harm consumers, competitors, and even the
trademark ecosystem.  Part IV argues that courts can read the Lanham Act
broadly enough to account for residual consumer goodwill in every forfeiture
case and provides a framework for that analysis.  Part V offers an auction
mechanism intended to uncover information about residual consumer good-
will and increase the likelihood that the party who secures rights in the mark
will satisfy consumer expectations.
I. TRADEMARK FORFEITURE
Trademark law is dominated by an economic search cost account that
purports to protect trademarks in order to improve the quality of informa-
tion in the marketplace.35  Trademark law aims to reduce consumer search
34 The Ninth Circuit has colorfully summarized the difficulty in balancing these goals:
Trademark infringement is a peculiarly complex area of the law. . . . [E]ach case
involves an effort to achieve three distinct objectives which, to a degree, are in
conflict. . . . [Preserving free competition] dictates a degree of restraint in the
pursuit of the first two [objectives]; [protecting mark owner investment] can be
pushed beyond the reasonable needs of [consumers]; and each requires for its
proper implementation the exercise of judicial intuition supported, to the extent
possible, by relevant facts.
HMH Publ’g Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974).
35 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs]
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costs by ensuring that a given mark can convey necessary source-identifying
information to consumers.36  To that end, the law protects a mark owner
from the confusing or fraudulent use of identical or similar marks for the
same or similar products and services so that the mark provides a consistent
signal to consumers.37  Without trademark protection, economists posit that
consumers would spend more time than is optimal trying to distinguish one
product from another.38
Trademark law is thus efficient to the extent it reduces consumer search
costs, which can in turn enable vigorous competition on price and quality.39
The rational consumer who encounters Product X will only spend time
searching for other equivalent products if the savings from finding a cheaper
product are greater than the cost of searching for it.40  Lowering search costs
thus is likely to increase price competition.41  In addition, maintaining trade-
marks as a consistent signal of source (and therefore quality) provides the
mark owning firm with an incentive to maintain product quality.42  Consum-
(arguing that the historical normative goal of trademark law is to foster the flow of infor-
mation in markets, thereby reducing consumer search costs); Nicholas S. Economides, The
Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525–27 (1988) (suggesting that trade-
marks primarily exist to enhance consumer decisions and to create incentives for firms to
produce desirable products); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033–34
(2006) (noting that traditional trademark protection is consumer-centered); Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840
(2007) [hereinafter McKenna, Normative Foundations] (“[T]rademark law’s core policies
[are] protecting consumers and improving the quality of information in the market-
place.”); I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 207, 208–11 (1995) (providing empirical evidence supporting the search cost
rationale). But see Deven R. Desai, The Chicago School Trap in Trademark: The Co-Evolution of
Corporate, Antitrust, and Trademark Law, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 551 (2015) (arguing that the
search cost account is subordinate to a Chicago-school approach that maximizes freedom
of action for mark owners).
36 Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 35, at 778.
37 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1224–25 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley,
Limiting Doctrines].
38 Economides, supra note 35, at 526.
39 S. REP. NO. 1333, at 4 (1946) (noting that safeguarding fair competition is a core
purpose of trademark protection).
40 J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The Informational Function of Trademarks, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991, 999 (2009); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003) (explaining that a trade-
mark saves search costs because it “is a shorthand way of telling [consumers] that the
attributes are the same as that of the brand [they] enjoyed earlier” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
41 Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Easily
identified trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for what they desire,
and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the market.”).
42 Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 28, at 1694 (summarizing the view that
“protecting [trademark] owners against the use of confusingly similar marks will
encourage investment in brand quality and simultaneously protect consumers from
confusion”).
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ers do not necessarily care who sells the good, but they care whether or not
the product they receive is consistent from buying experience to buying
experience.  Trademark law encourages a mark owner to maintain consistent
quality by keeping competitors from using a confusingly similar mark on a
similar product.43  This protection allows the owner to internalize some of
the costs of maintaining and sending signals about source and quality.  The
law thus protects trademarks so that they can be used to convey accurate
information about the mark which reduces consumer search costs, encour-
ages the mark owner to invest in consistent quality, and prevents harmful
consumer confusion.44  These related goals are three facets of what Robert
Bone calls the “information transmission function” of trademarks.45
Unlike other intellectual property regimes, the trademark regime offers
perpetual protection.46  So long as a critical mass of consumers continues to
see the mark as a source identifier, a trademark can last forever.  But trade-
mark protection can expire if the mark owner engages in behavior that for-
feits the source significance of the mark.47  This Part outlines the trademark
forfeiture mechanisms as they currently operate, and the ostensible statutory
basis for the preoccupation with mark owner behavior and the neglect of
consumer perception.
This Part also explains how trademark’s forfeiture mechanisms operate
like information forcing penalty default rules.  Unfortunately, the informa-
tion they force is incomplete.  Many of the forfeiture mechanisms described
in this Part ignore consumer perception.48  The law protects trademarks to
the extent that consumers (are likely to) invest the mark with source signifi-
cance, and to the extent that the use by another of a similar mark on similar
products is likely to confuse consumers.49  The law presumes that an inher-
ently distinctive term used as a mark communicates source information to
consumers from its first use in commerce.50  A descriptive term is presumed
not to communicate source information unless the mark owner provides evi-
43 Id.
44 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2116
(2004) (“[R]educing consumer search costs, maintaining and improving product quality,
and remedying intentional deception . . . all relate to the quality of the product informa-
tion available to consumers.  Even the [quality] incentive . . . is linked to safeguarding the
information transmission function of marks.”).
45 Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 33, at 555; id. at 549 (describing the “informa-
tion transmission model” which “views trademarks as devices for communicating informa-
tion to the market and sees the goal of trademark law as preventing others from using
similar marks to deceive or confuse consumers” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
48 In particular, while courts often take evidence of how consumers see the mark when
the mark may have slid into genericness, evidence of consumer confusion is rarely consid-
ered in resolving other forfeiture disputes.
49 Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 119 (describing the central role of
consumer confusion in assessing whether a junior user infringes the trademark rights of a
senior user).
50 See Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 28, at 1377.
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dence that the term has acquired source significance.51  Consumer percep-
tion is an essential aspect of a word or symbol’s operation as a mark.  To the
extent that trademark forfeiture mechanisms ignore consumer perception,
they operate contrary to the information-transmission function of trademark
law.
A. Trademark’s Forfeiture Mechanisms
The law has provided several forfeiture mechanisms that can put an end
to a mark’s legal protection.  A mark may be forfeited through generislide,
falling into the public domain if consumers begin to use it primarily as a
generic product indicator, or if the mark owner misuses it as a generic desig-
nation.52  A trademark can also expire if the mark owner suspends use of the
mark and cannot show a clear intent to resume use;53 if the mark is modified
so significantly that the new version no longer presents a consistent commer-
cial impression with the old version;54 if the mark is sold “in gross,” or with-
out its underlying goodwill; or if the mark owner licenses the mark without
engaging in quality control over licensees (“naked licensing”).55  Courts gen-
erally require that forfeiture “should be strictly proved.”56
For the most part, these forfeiture mechanisms work like a binary switch.
The mark is protectable until the mark owner’s behavior crosses the relevant
threshold.  Once the mark crosses one of these forfeiture thresholds, the
mark loses its priority,57 and a competitor may appropriate the mark to desig-
nate its own products.58  The appropriator who first uses the mark after for-
51 See id. at 1375–79.
52 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1
(4th ed. 2017).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
54 Id.
55 See Michelle S. Friedman, Naked Trademark Licenses in Business Format Franchising: The
Quality Control Requirement and the Role of Local Culture, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 353, 360
(2005).
56 George Nelson Found. v. Modernica, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 635, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(quoting Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
57 Gen. Cigar Co. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 647, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[A] party
that is found to have abandoned its mark is deprived of any claim to priority in the mark
before the date of abandonment and may regain rights in the mark only through subse-
quent use after the time of abandonment.” (quoting Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v.
Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
58 Generic terms are the exception.  When a mark slides into genericness, any pro-
ducer can use the forfeited mark to identify or describe the product sold, but no one can
acquire exclusive rights in it.  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 12:1 (“[O]nce declared to be a
generic name, the designation enters the ‘linguistic commons’ and is free for all to use.”).
But see Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 124 (describing how SINGER and
GOODYEAR marks reacquired source significance after forfeiture through generislide).
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feiture secures priority of use.59  The appropriator may also register the
forfeited mark,60 which conveys a “right of priority, nationwide in effect . . .
against any other person except for a person whose mark has not been
abandoned.”61
If the mark is deemed forfeited, the prior mark owner has no remedy
against the appropriation, even if a significant number of consumers will be
confused by the shift in ownership.62  With the exception of generislide
cases, forfeiture mechanisms focus exclusively on mark owner behavior and
either ignore consumer perception or try to uncover it with ill-suited prox-
ies.63  Defenders of the status quo can turn to a circumscribed reading of
relevant provisions of the Lanham Act64: the statutory language, reproduced
below, focuses on mark owner behavior.65
1. Statutory Language
Section 45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1127) defines, in general
terms, how forfeiture occurs:
A mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the following
occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such
use.  Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances.  Nonuse for
3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.  “Use” of
a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course
of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omis-
sion as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for
the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise
59 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 16:1 (“The basic rule of trademark ownership in
the United States is priority of use.”). But see Stephen M. Atkinson, Appropriation of Expressly
Abandoned Trademarks: Caveat Emptor?, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1975) (arguing the subse-
quent user should not be permitted to rely on secondary meaning retained from the for-
mer use); Robert A. Kargen, Trademark Law—The First User of an Abandoned Trademark
Acquires the Secondary Meaning Associated with the Abandoned Mark by Virtue of His First Use, 64
TRADEMARK REP. 8, 10–11 (1974).
60 See, e.g., Cal. Cedar Prods. Co. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 724 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir.
1984) (“[T]he first party to use an abandoned trademark in a commercially meaningful
way after its abandonment, is entitled to exclusive ownership and use of that trademark
and trade dress.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).
61 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995)
(“A finding of abandonment can . . . result in the forfeiture of valuable rights and can also
create the potential for confusion.”).
63 See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 355.
64 The Lanham Act provides federal trademark protection. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141.
65 Tushnet, supra note 32, at 355 n.11 (“[T]he Lanham Act defines abandonment
solely in producer-focused terms.”).  This Article argues in Section IV.A that the statutory
language can be read capaciously enough for courts to consider consumer perception.
Parts II and III lay out the argument for why courts should do so.
 2017] valuing  residual  goodwill 823
to lose its significance as a mark.  Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for
determining abandonment under this paragraph.66
The Lanham Act divides what it calls the abandonment inquiry into
three parts: abandonment through nonuse,67 abandonment through gener-
islide,68 and abandonment through other loss of source significance, which
includes naked licensing and assignment in gross.69  The statutory language
suggests that the mark owner, rather than the consumer, retains a position of
primacy with regard to determining when trademark protection is
forfeited.70
First, a mark is deemed abandoned “[w]hen its use has been discontin-
ued with intent not to resume such use.”71  The statutory language of section
1127(1) clearly bases abandonment through nonuse on the actions of the
mark owner.72  The language makes no mention of consumer perception.
Second, a mark is deemed abandoned “[w]hen any course of conduct of
the owner . . . causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or
services on or in connection with which it is used.”73  The language of section
1127(2) indicates that when a mark becomes generic, it does so through acts
of omission or commission by the mark owner, rather than a shift in percep-
tion on the part of consumers.  That is a peculiar construction in light of the
caselaw, which looks primarily at whether the majority of consumers have
come to see the mark as a generic designation.74
Third, forfeiture occurs “[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner . . .
causes the mark . . . to lose its [source] significance as a mark.”75  Claims of
forfeiture through assignment in gross and naked licensing fit under this sub-
part of section 1127(2).  When the mark owner assigns a mark without the
transfer of goodwill, its action forfeits the priority in the assigned mark.76
And, if the mark owner licenses the mark without the right quality control
measures, it forfeits its rights in the licensed mark.77
66 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012), “abandoned”.
67 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.05(1) (Matthew Bender ed.,
2017).
68 Id. § 3.05(9)(0a).
69 Id. § 3.05(9)(a).
70 Id. § 3.05(01) (“As long as a mark owner uses its mark, it may maintain rights in that
mark, but . . . [i]f the owner stops using a mark and [the owner] intends not to resume its
use, it is said to have abandoned the mark.” (emphasis added)).
71 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1), “abandoned”.
72 Id.; see also infra subsection I.A.3.
73 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2), “abandoned”.
74 See infra subsection I.A.2.
75 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2), “abandoned”.
76 See infra subsection I.A.4; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77 See infra subsection I.A.5.
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Source significance—the connection between mark and source that
trademark law protects—depends on consumer perception,78 but outside of
the context of generislide, the caselaw has done little to recognize the role of
consumer perception and consumer use in determining whether a trade-
mark has lost its source significance.79  Trademark’s forfeiture mechanisms
are, for the most part, out of sync with the information-transmission account
of trademark protection and fail to incentivize the disclosure of important
information about potential consumer harm.  The generislide inquiry, dis-
cussed in the next Section, is the exemplary exception, considering both
mark-owner effort and public perception.
2. Generislide Through Consumer Use
Unlike the other forfeiture mechanisms described below, courts
expressly consider consumer perception when determining whether a mark
has experienced a slide into genericness.80  Once a majority of consumers
see the mark as a generic product identifier, it no longer qualifies for trade-
mark protection, even if a substantial minority of consumers continue to use
the mark as a source signifier.81  When evaluating whether a mark has suf-
fered “generislide,”82 courts ask whether consumers primarily use the mark
as a generic designation for the product or service, rather than as a source
signifier.  In generislide cases, parties frequently consider survey evidence
designed to reveal whether a majority of consumers see the mark as a source
signifier or as a generic product designation.83
But generislide inquiries do not ignore mark owner behavior.  Indeed,
many generislide cases are characterized by mark owner misuse of the mark
78 See, e.g., Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970)
(source significance does not depend on “the extent of the promotional efforts, but their
effectiveness in altering the meaning of [the mark] to the consuming public”).
79 Some scholars have argued that subsection (2) of the abandonment definition can
be read broadly, but caution against presuming that courts will so read it.  Tal S. Benschar
et al., Covenant Not to Sue: A Super Sack or Just a Wet Paper Bag?, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 1213,
1233 (2012).  Nevertheless, in the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of naked licensing in Exxon
Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., the court embraces this strong reading of the language of
subsection (2) of the abandonment definition.  109 F.3d 1070, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997) (“We,
like the district court, would find it wholly anomalous to presume a loss of trademark signifi-
cance merely because Exxon, in the course of diligently protecting its mark, entered into
agreements designed to preserve the distinctiveness and strength of that mark.”).
80 Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 150 (“[C]ourts considering a claim
of [generislide] look for evidence that a majority of the relevant consumer base . . . uses
the mark as a generic product designation.”).
81 See id. at 149–50.
82 I use the term generislide, as opposed to genericness, genericide, or some awkward
construction about a fall into genericness because it nicely captures the erosion of source
significance through changing consumer usage over time.
83 See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 163 (“The traditional ‘Teflon’
and ‘Thermos’ surveys applied in generislide disputes investigate how consumers perceive
and use the challenged mark.” (citing E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods., Inc., 538
F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2008))).
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as both a source signifier and a generic product designation.84  For example,
in classic generislide cases forfeiting rights to the Singer and Aspirin trade-
marks,85 the mark owner’s use of the mark as a generic product designation
was seen as a critical factor contributing to changing consumer perception.
The generislide inquiry is well balanced and consistent with the informa-
tion-transmission function of trademark law.  Courts seek information about
both mark owner behavior and consumer perception in determining
whether the mark is forfeited.  Unlike the generislide inquiry, the other for-
feiture mechanisms are skewed, failing to uncover evidence of consumer per-
ception, and nearly always ignoring it when it is presented.
3. Abandonment Through Nonuse
Abandonment through nonuse occurs when the mark owner stops using
the mark.86  Abandonment occasionally happens when a mark owner clearly
signals its intent to stop using the mark.87  More frequently, the mark owner
makes no such admission, but its rights in the mark may be challenged on
the ground that abandonment should be inferred from a period of nonuse.88
Courts have developed a two-part abandonment inquiry.  The party
claiming abandonment through nonuse must establish (1) “discontinuance
of trademark use” by the mark owner and (2) the mark owner’s “intent not to
resume such use.”89  The standard abandonment inquiry focuses on mark
owner behavior but ignores consumer perception.  Neither of the aforemen-
tioned factors—discontinuance or intent to resume use—account for
84 See 1 LALONDE, supra note 67, § 3.05(9)(a)(2) (noting instances where mark
owner’s misuse of the mark contributes to generislide).
85 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 183 (1896) (noting that the Singer
Manufacturing Co. contributed to the generislide of the Singer mark by voluntarily apply-
ing it to the companies’ sewing machines “as a designation of the general type of machines
made by them,” rather than as a source signifier); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F.
505, 510–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding Aspirin generic among consumers in part because
Bayer used Aspirin as a generic product designation, rather than as a trademark on some
product packaging).
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
87 See, e.g., Cal. Cedar Prods. Co. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 724 F.2d 827, 829–30 (9th
Cir. 1984) (mark owner announced it would discontinue its line of Duraflame artificial fire
logs, leading to a race among potential appropriators to be the first to use the mark in
commerce and thus acquire priority over other firms). But see Manhattan Indus., Inc. v.
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing two firms racing to
first use an abandoned mark to bring their respective products to market, expressing confi-
dence that each could craft sufficiently distinct labels to allow sophisticated purchasers of
women’s clothing to distinguish their products).
88 Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (“[I]ntent may be inferred when
the facts are shown, yet the facts must be adequate to support the finding.”).
89 Grocery Outlet Inc. v. Albertson’s Inc., 497 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Electro Source, LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Grp., Inc., 438 F.3d 931,
935–36 (9th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23,
§ 17:11 (“[T]he requisite intent is an intent to resume a commercial level of use . . . .”).
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whether consumers still use the abandoned mark as a source signifier, or
whether they would assume a product bearing the mark comes from the
forfeiting owner.  The abandonment mechanism thus fails to force informa-
tion about consumer perception.
Courts and commentators articulate two main rationales for forfeiture
through abandonment.  First, it prevents an ostensible owner from “ware-
housing” a mark it does not use.90  Second, it pushes the abandoned mark
back into the public domain for use by a new seller.91  Returning the mark to
the public domain is considered efficient because an abandoned mark is pre-
sumed to bear no goodwill.92
Courts are often invited to consider evidence of residual goodwill, but
typically reject the invitation.93  For example, in Exxon Corp. v. Humble Explo-
ration Co., the court concluded that it could not extend protection to an
abandoned mark even if recognizing residual goodwill were good policy,94
because doing so could not be squared with the language of the statute.95
On extremely rare occasions, a court takes note that consumers may be
confused by the appropriation of an abandoned mark.96  Nonetheless, even
in the small handful of abandonment cases that consider residual consumer
goodwill, the court focuses on the behavior of the mark owner and its intent
to abandon and resume use of the mark.97  Indeed, residual goodwill is
90 Exxon Corp. v. Humble Expl. Co., 695 F.2d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 1983).  Warehousing is
frowned upon as inefficient.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 281 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Eco-
nomic Perspective] (observing that warehousing registration without use of marks in Japan
increases the cost of entering that market).
91 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Rather than
countenancing the ‘removal’ or retirement of the abandoned mark from commercial
speech, trademark law allows it to be used by another.”); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23,
§ 17:1 (“Abandonment paves the way for future possession and property in any other per-
son.” (citing Russell v. Caroline-Becker, Inc., 142 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 1957))). But see Indi-
anapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir.
1994) (recognizing but expressing skepticism about the aforementioned principle).
92 Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 778
(1990).
93 But see Note, Abandonment as a Defense in Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition Cases, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 695, 696–97 (1930) (arguing that under pre-Lanham Act caselaw, aban-
donment occurs as goodwill expires; until source significance dissipates, the unused mark
cannot be appropriated by another, and the intent of the mark owner is irrelevant).
94 Other cases suggest in dicta that the law might recognize residual goodwill on policy
grounds.  See, e.g., Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. Lyon Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 31, 35 n.5
(T.T.A.B. 1962) (noting in dicta that even assuming the opposed had abandoned the
LYON mark, substantial goodwill might persist “until such time as it can be shown that the
purchasing public generally no longer is reasonably likely to associate [a new entrant’s]
product with the [abandoning] party”).
95 Exxon Corp., 695 F.2d at 101.
96 See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416.
97 Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1060 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he record is clear that [the mark owner] never intended to abandon its
trademark.”).
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described as the value accrued by the mark owner, rather than the usefulness
of the mark to a consumer.98  And in those cases where residual goodwill is
discussed, the discussion almost always turns on the manner in which the
mark owner kept the product in front of the public eye, rather than evidence
of consumer perception about the mark.99  For example, in Ferrari S.p.A.
Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, the court held that trade dress
in the Ferrari “Daytona Spyder” had not been abandoned, even though new
models had not been sold since the early seventies, because the cars were still
on the road and parts for the cars were still available.100
This tendency to ignore consumer investment in goodwill is unfortu-
nate.101  The law will struggle to protect the information-transmission func-
tion of trademarks if it ignores how appropriation of a mark abandoned
through nonuse is understood by consumers.102  For example, Coca-Cola’s
restoration of the Surge mark highlights the potential for consumer confu-
sion.103  A critical mass of consumers petitioned Coke to bring Surge back,
and the company responded.  But if one of the intent-to-use applicants had
commenced use during Coke’s hiatus from the market, that applicant would
secure priority in the mark and be free to use Surge to sell its beverages.  The
goodwill which those consumers continued to invest in the Surge mark as a
source signifier pointing back to Coke would be squandered—consumers try-
98 See id. at 1059 (noting that goodwill “represents the reputation developed by its
owner for the nature and quality of goods or services sold by him”).  Cases like Defiance
Button consider residual consumer goodwill indirectly, treating it as a property right in the
hands of the mark owner that doesn’t automatically dissipate at the first moment of non-
use. Id. at 1060 (“[T]he purpose of a mark is to protect the goodwill of a business . . . and
if there is no business there is no goodwill and therefore nothing to protect.  This is not to
say, however, . . . that at the moment business is suspended the goodwill ceases to exist.”
(quoting Merry Hull & Co. v. Hi-Line Co., 243 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1965))); see also 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 17:14.
99 See Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843, 1851–52 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
100 Id. at 1848–49.
101 Mark McKenna argues that trademark law focuses on protecting mark owners from
trade diversion, rather than protecting consumers from confusion, and points to the aban-
donment mechanism as evidence of that focus.  McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra
note 35, at 1893 (“[The abandonment] rule makes little sense viewed through a consumer
protection lens because consumers may continue to associate a mark with a particular pro-
ducer for some time after that producer has ceased use.”); see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 397, 398 (1990) (“[Trademark] defenses [like abandonment] centered on the
commercial requirements of the competitive marketplace . . . [and] were understood
strictly by reference to these commercial interests.”).
102 Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 373 (2010)
(“[O]ne goal of abandonment law [generally] should be to reduce [ ] associated confusion
costs.”).
103 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
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ing the beverage would likely be disappointed.  Coke, in turn, would have no
ground to object if—as is likely—a court should deem Surge abandoned.104
Courts consider consumer perception more explicitly in a discrete sub-
set of abandonment inquiries involving modified marks.105  The owner of a
mark threatened with forfeiture through nonuse may argue the mark was not
abandoned, but updated.106  If the modified mark and its predecessor create
“the same general commercial impression,”107 the mark owner can tack
back, or use the priority of the predecessor mark.108  If not, the priority is
forfeited.109  For example, in Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., a com-
petitor successfully petitioned to cancel the registration of “CLOTHES THAT
WORK” over the mark owner’s objection that its mark was a modification of a
prior registration, “CLOTHES THAT WORK.  FOR THE WORK YOU
DO.”110  The court affirmed the grant of cancellation by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board on the ground that the newer mark was not equivalent to
the earlier mark.111
Tacking cases properly disclose some information about residual con-
sumer goodwill.  But courts rarely take direct survey evidence of consumer
perception about the continuing commercial impression of the original and
modified marks.112  The tacking inquiry improves on the standard abandon-
ment inquiry, but nevertheless fails to fully account for consumer perception
or discover information about residual goodwill.
104 See also Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1249 (“[R]eleasing
marks back to the open market can have a rather significant negative impact on consumer
search.  If a company builds up substantial goodwill before going out of business, that
goodwill will often persist long after the company and its products disappear.”).
105 See Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that in such cases, consumers must “consider both [marks in question] as the
same”), abrogated by Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995)
(“A change in the kinds of goods or services marketed under the trademark is not an
abandonment.”).
107 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS & MONOPOLIES § 20:65 (4th ed. 2017).  Mark and Jacoby categorize residual con-
sumer goodwill toward an abandoned mark as a type of continuing commercial
impression. See Gideon Mark & Jacob Jacoby, Continuing Commercial Impression: Applications
and Measurement, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2006).
108 Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1157.
111 Id. at 1160.
112 Mark & Jacoby, supra note 107, at 449 (“[Survey] evidence very infrequently has
been submitted to support or rebut a claim of continuing commercial impression.”).
Some courts suggested survey evidence was not needed because the question of tacking was
a question of law. See, e.g., Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159.  The Supreme Court recently
abrogated Van Dyne-Crotty, holding that tacking is a question of fact.  Hana Fin., Inc. v.
Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 912 (2015).  It is unclear whether that will increase the fre-
quency with which consumer surveys will be presented in tacking cases.
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4. Assignment in Gross
The law protects trademarks because allowing unauthorized use may
confuse consumers, who expect to buy A’s product with its relevant charac-
teristics when selecting a product with A’s mark, but instead select B’s prod-
uct.113  This same confusion may arise if a mark is assigned from one party to
another, but the assignee’s product differs significantly from the assignor’s.
Such use might defraud or confuse the purchasing public.114  The law thus
bars assignment “in gross,” or without the transfer of the assignor’s good-
will.115  If assignment in gross occurs, the mark can be cancelled for misrep-
resenting the source of marked products116 or losing its significance as a
mark.117
Like the modification inquiry, courts considering whether assignment in
gross forfeits the mark look for continuity, but instead of continuity of the
mark, courts look for continuity of product quality.118  Sufficient continuity is
detected by looking at assignee inputs and outputs.  First, courts ask whether
the assignee has access to the materials that would allow it to preserve con-
tinuity with the assignor’s product.119  If the trademark is assigned as part of
the purchase of a “total business,”120 including physical assets or trade
secrets, courts typically assume the assignee also acquired goodwill.121
113 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185 (1948).
114 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:3 (citing, inter alia, Sugar Busters LLC v. Bren-
nan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of the rule prohibiting the sale or
assignment of a trademark in gross is to prevent a consumer from being misled or con-
fused as to the source and nature of the goods or services that he or she acquires.”));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR COMPETITION § 34(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1995); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 410 (1999) (“Allowing a trademark
owner to assign a mark without the associated, underlying business risks the very confusion
trademark law aims to remedy.”).
115 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:3.  Section 10 of the Lanham Act states that a
registered trademark is assignable “with the good will of the business in which the mark is
used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and
symbolized by the mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012).
116 Id. § 1064(3).
117 Id. § 1127.
118 See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879) (holding, prior to the passage of
the Lanham Act, that a trademark “may not be the subject of sale” separate from the origi-
nal manufacturer’s product, but “the right to the use of the trade-mark may be lawfully
transferred with” the place of manufacture).
119 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:23.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Am. Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 454 (6th Cir.
1942) (holding that “intangible assets” like trademarks pass with the purchase of the busi-
ness and its accoutrements, and that a judicial sale of the entire business did not abandon
the mark).  If the assignee does not acquire tangible assets, courts will ask whether it
acquired sufficient assets to “go on in real continuity with [the] past.” Merry Hull & Co. v.
Hi-Line Co., 243 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (quoting Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115
F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Second, courts look at the assignee’s output to determine whether the
assignee is using the assigned mark on goods “having substantially the same
characteristics” as those of the assignor.122  Thus, in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette
Co., the court held the assignee forfeited the priority in the assigned mark—
Peppy for a cola beverage—by using Peppy for a pepper-flavored
beverage.123
On the other hand, if the assignee offers substantially the same product,
the assignment will not forfeit the mark, even if the quality has changed
somewhat.124  For example, in Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., the
court declined to hold the assignee forfeited its priority, even though it
offered cigarette paper of lower quality than the assignor.125  This shift in
quality did not alter “the fundamental nature” of the product post-assign-
ment, because even low quality cigarette paper was identifiable as cigarette
paper.  Continuity required nothing more.126
Inputs and outputs are better proxies for consumer perception than
trademark use or its absence—the focus of the abandonment inquiry.  Never-
theless, direct evidence of consumer confusion is not considered in assign-
ment in gross cases either.  The assignment mechanism also fails to force
information about residual goodwill.
5. Naked Licensing
Licensing done wrong can also extinguish trademark protection.  A “sys-
tem of naked licensing,” or licensing without quality control, can forfeit the
licensor’s mark.127  Early on, any licensing of a trademark was seen as inher-
ently misleading,128 and thus impermissible,129 because licensing would vio-
122 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1969).
123 Id. at 286.
124 See, e.g., Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Tr. Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (mark signifying a promise to guarantee a check can be assigned from a super-
market chain to a credit card organization).
125 Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(“[W]here the product or service is essentially the same before and after the transfer, varia-
tions in type or quality will not invalidate the assignment.”).  Glynn Lunney argues that the
sufficient continuity rule sets too low a bar and thus “authorizes precisely those assign-
ments most likely to create such confusion.”  Lunney, supra note 114, at 416 (citing Pep-
siCo, 416 F.2d at 286–87).
126 See Bambu Sales, 693 F. Supp. at 908.  This is consistent with how courts treat product
change by a mark owner outside of the assignment context.  Midlothian Labs., L.L.C. v.
Pamlab, L.L.C., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1077 (M.D. Ala. 2007), vacated in part on reconsidera-
tion, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1095.
127 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
Forfeiting a mark through naked licensing will estop the licensor from exercising legal
rights in the mark. See Sheila’s Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 124
(5th Cir. 1973).  It can also result in the cancellation of federal trademark registration. See
Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002).
128 Friedman, supra note 55, at 376.
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late the presumption that all marked products come from a single physical
source.130
Courts later relaxed the bar against licensing to better suit a modern
view of consumer sophistication and business necessity,131 consistent with a
theory that a trademark provides information about consistent quality, and
thus source need not be strictly defined.132  The Lanham Act now contem-
plates that use by a licensee will “inure to the benefit of the registrant” with-
out threatening the validity of the mark, “provided [the licensed] mark is not
used in such manner as to deceive the public.”133  However, licensors are still
burdened by the common law’s historical distrust of licensing.134  Thus,
licensing which occurs without a certain level of quality control will forfeit
protection in the licensed mark.
Most courts presume that licensing without quality control will inevitably
confuse consumers.135  As the Second Circuit articulated the standard, “the
only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used by licensees
is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable
manner the activities of his licensees.”136  But unlike the assignment inquiry,
which considers both inputs (assignor resources) and outputs (assignee’s
consistent product quality), the traditional naked licensing inquiry focuses
solely on the inputs: the licensor’s quality control mechanisms.  Courts con-
sidering the naked licensing defense do not ask whether consumers are actu-
ally confused.  Indeed, courts rarely bother to inquire whether the licensee
actually offers products or services of inconsistent or inferior quality.137  If
quality control measures are detected, then the court concludes, “there is no
reason to believe that the public will be misled.”138
129 See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75
(8th Cir. 1901) (“A trade-mark cannot be assigned, or its use licensed, except as incidental
to a transfer of the business or property in connection with which it has been used.”).
130 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:39.
131 See Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP.
19, 24 (1995).  Some scholars have stylized the shift in jurisprudence as a shift from a focus
on the mark as a signifier of source to a guarantor of a consistent level of quality. See
Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
363, 363–65 (1974).
132 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314–15 (1988) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
133 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012).
134 See, e.g., Movie Mania Metro, Inc. v. GZ DVD’s Inc., 857 N.W.2d 677, 689 n.16
(Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that naked licensing “would render [a] mark not valid
under the common law and the Lanham Act”).
135 See, e.g., U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 140 (3d Cir. 1981) (“If a licensor
does not maintain control of his licensees in their use of the license, the public may be
damaged by products that, despite their trademark, do not have the normal quality of such
goods.”).
136 See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
137 See, e.g., El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir.
1986) (“[T]he actual quality of the goods is irrelevant.”).
138 Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir. 1997).
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But when quality control measures are missing, courts forfeit the mark,
even if there is no evidence of confusion and no inconsistency as to quality.
For example, in Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc.,139 the owner of
Eva’s Bridal, a bridal store in a North Chicago suburb, licensed the Eva’s
Bridal mark to a cousin, who opened a second store in a different suburb.140
The licensor engaged in no formal quality control.141  The court presumed,
based on the lack of quality control, that a customer who visited the stores
operated by the licensor and licensee “might not have found a common
ambiance or means of doing business.”142  That was sufficient to forfeit the
mark, even though the licensees were relatives and the stores shared the
same dress designer.143
A few outlier cases consider licensee quality—similar to the assignee out-
put question in assignment in gross cases.  For example, in Brewski Beer Co. v.
Brewski Bros., Inc.,144 the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board held that the
mark in question was not forfeited through naked licensing because “satisfac-
tory quality was maintained, and, hence, no deception of purchasers
occurred.”145  Some universities also successfully argue that longstanding
uncontrolled use has not forfeited rights in their respective marks, either
because the quality of marked goods “remained at an acceptable level in vir-
tually all instances,”146 (similar to the continuity requirement from assign-
ment in gross cases) or because the court found that the mark retained
source significance after the period of uncontrolled licensing.147  But these
cases are the exception rather than the rule.148  In the naked licensing con-
text, like abandonment and assignment in gross, the law fails to encourage
parties to consider or disclose information about actual or likely consumer
disappointment.
Essentially, in that sliver of abandonment and naked licensing cases
where courts consider residual consumer goodwill, they contort the analysis
139 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2011).
140 Id. at 789.
141 Id. at 790 (noting that the plaintiffs believed “they had no reason to superintend
any aspects of defendants’ business”).
142 Id. at 791.
143 Id.
144 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
145 Id. at 1288 (quoting Stockpot, Inc. v. Stock Pot Rest., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 52,
59 (T.T.A.B. 1983), aff’d, 737 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
146 Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396
(T.T.A.B. 1994).
147 See Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 171
(M.D.N.C. 1989).
148 But see Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 341, 395 (2007) (arguing that courts have started using the quality of the
licensee’s offerings as a proxy for quality control mechanisms); Mark P. McKenna, Testing
Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 89 (2009) (citing the aforemen-
tioned cases as evidence that the TTAB “fairly routinely” refuses to cancel trademarks for
naked licensing in cases “in which the purported licensee’s products were of reasonable
quality”).
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to fit perceived statutory requirements.  Courts seem to intuit that consumers
will continue to vest a mark with residual goodwill in some cases, although
courts are forced to voice those intuitions using unaccommodating tests to
remain consistent with perceived statutory commitments.  As a result, courts
may be relying on intuition in these cases, accounting for residual goodwill
only where it seems obvious—whether or not it actually occurs.149
B. Information-Forcing Failures
These forfeiture mechanisms serve as information-forcing penalty
default rules, but they are poorly focused, failing in large part to encourage
the disclosure of information about consumer use of the endangered
mark.150  An information-forcing penalty default rule encourages disclosure
of information in situations where one might expect information asymmetry
to harm the uninformed party.151  Information-forcing penalty default rules
are most easily justified when a well-informed participant is situated to solve a
problem caused by incomplete information, and where a default rule can
penalize the underproduction of information and thus cabin strategic behav-
ior.152  For example, the default rule in contract law denying unforeseeable
damages can be justified as a rule that incentivizes the promisee to disclose
its unique needs so that promisors can correctly price the transaction and
take efficient precautions.153  Information-forcing penalty default rules are
not uncommon in IP regimes.  For instance, many patent doctrines can be
understood as penalty default rules that incentivize clear disclosure of the
patented invention.154
149 See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
150 Others have argued that trademark law is generally structured to encourage disclo-
sure of needed information. See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 708 (“Like
adverse possession, trademark use is also communicative and information forcing.  Con-
sumers come to understand the scope of the mark owner’s claim as the mark is used in
commerce to designate goods and services from a consistent source.  Competitors are also
notified of the trademark owner’s claim through her productive use.”); Jeremy N. Sheff,
Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 779 (2012) (describing the dominant justification of
trademark law as espousing “information-forcing policies”).
151 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 806–07 (2001). See generally Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Informa-
tion and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).
152 See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 212–17 (2002).
153 See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Ex. 341; RICHARD A. POS-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 114–15 (3d ed. 1986); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100
(1989). But see Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 617 (1990) (arguing that “strategic incentives in bargaining
seem to cut against the idea that the penalty default rule in Hadley can force promisees to
reveal information”).
154 See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technol-
ogy: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 506 (2008)
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Trademark law’s forfeiture mechanisms ostensibly fulfill similar func-
tions.  For example, after a period of nonuse, the abandonment mechanism
strips protection from the mark unless the mark owner presents evidence of a
bona fide intent to resume use of the mark.155  But in most cases, trademark
forfeiture mechanisms are forcing incomplete information.  In some cases,
these mechanisms force the wrong information.  Asking whether the mark
owner has credible plans to resume use tells us little about the relative costs
and benefits that allowing reassignment of the mark would impose on con-
sumers and competitors or convey to the hopeful appropriator.  Likewise, the
existence of a right to police in the naked licensing context tells us little
about whether allowing the licensing relationship to continue imposes more
costs on consumers than allowing uncontrolled use of the mark by a party
who pays no license.  And mere category similarity between the product sold
by the assignor and the assignee under the mark does not guarantee that
consumers will not be confused or injured by the assignment.
The current trademark forfeiture mechanisms also cannot be justified as
inquiry-simplifying rules.  Each one is context sensitive, resembling fuzzy
standards instead of bright line rules.156  And each of these standards mis-
handles their respective inquiry by focusing exclusively on mark owner
behavior.  The generislide threshold, which forfeits mark protection if the
majority of consumers see the mark as a product identifier instead of a
source signifier, is both more rule-like than other forfeiture mechanisms and
properly directed to disclose information about consumer use in addition to
mark owner behavior.157
(discussing information-forcing aspects of disclosure doctrine in patent prosecution);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 723, 753–62 (2009) (discussing information-forcing aspects of patent law’s ineq-
uitable conduct doctrine—information is forced from the party with the best access to
information); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 70–71 (2005) (discussing value of information-forcing rules in the patent context—rules
that create an incentive for patent seekers to discover and disclose additional information
prior to obtaining approval for a patent application); Wagner, supra note 152, at 159, 168
(“[T]he fact that the application of prosecution history estoppel can limit patent scope
creates incentives for prospective patentees to avoid such a penalty by adjusting their
behavior.”); cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patent Claims, 113 MICH. L. REV. 513, 558 (2015)
(defending claimant-drafted patent claims as a mechanism that, properly timed and prop-
erly weighted, can overcome information asymmetries endemic to patent law).
155 See Strahilevitz, supra note 102, at 390–91.
156 The abandonment mechanism could become more rule-like if the three-year prima
facie abandonment window was crystalized into per se abandonment, but that is not the
current system. See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 764.
157 Compare Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 149–50 (“[C]ourts consider-
ing a claim of ex post genericness look for evidence that a majority of the relevant con-
sumer base now uses the mark as a generic product designation.”), with Baglin v. Cusenier
Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (“[I]ntent may be inferred when the facts are shown, yet the
facts must be adequate to support the finding.”).
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C. Forfeiture’s Inconsistent Presumptions
The decision to ignore evidence of consumer perception in forfeiture
cases is grounded on faulty presumptions from foundational trademark
cases.  Courts presume that certain mark owner behaviors (suspending use,
licensing without quality control) will confuse consumers, so they look for
those behaviors and presume the confusion.158  When these behaviors are
detected, the mark is forfeited.  Federal trademark law appears to encode
those presumptions into law, which then shapes forfeiture inquiries in the
courts.  But those assumptions are often in conflict with each other.  For
example, trademark law presumes that naked licensing and assignment in
gross confuse consumers by definition, while assuming away the confusion
that consumers will experience when a mark slides into genericness or is
abandoned through nonuse.159  This tendency is unsurprising.  Courts
invited to judge source significance or likely confusion from the perspective
of the typical consumer might understandably default to personal
experience.160
A properly functioning trademark system must manage consumer confu-
sion, and correctly calibrated forfeiture mechanisms are crucial tools for
achieving that goal.  Misalignment can allow market-distorting confusion to
creep into the trademark ecosystem.  For example, as Glynn Lunney notes,
the sufficient continuity standard for valid assignment of trademark rights,161
which allows the assignee’s product to vary significantly from the assignor’s
product, might set the bar against assignment too low and result in assigned
trademarks that “serve as a means for deceiving consumers as to what they
are buying.”162  But the same logic applies to an abandoned mark with
residual goodwill.  If the abandoned mark is used on similar goods or ser-
vices, deviation from consumer expectation will also result in the appropri-
ated mark serving as a means to deceive consumers.  In fact, the effect may
be more acute—the appropriator of an abandoned mark is not required to
meet even the relatively weak sufficient continuity standard required of
assignees, and likely has not invested in trade secrets, infrastructure, or
employees that would help it meet consumer expectations.
158 See Sheff, supra note 150, at 783.
159 See Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1239–40.
160 See A. Fuat Firat & Alladi Venkatesh, Liberatory Postmodernism and the Reenchantment of
Consumption, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 239, 258 (1995) (“[T]he notion of an individual con-
sumer is as much a construction of the social system as it is a product of the knowledge
system that claims to study consumers objectively from a distance, but is, in fact, construct-
ing her/him from this imaginary distance.”); Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in
Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 793 (2008) (“[W]hen students read cases in which
courts claim to be divining the beliefs of the typical consumer, they would do well to con-
sider to what extent this view of what is reasonable is shaded by the court’s own
experience.”).
161 See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
162 Lunney, supra note 114, at 415.
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Forfeiture through naked licensing also likely leaves consumers in one
of two problematic situations.  The naked licensee whose product is assumed
to be confusingly dissimilar to the licensor’s product cannot be barred from
selling said product to the public.  The mark owner effectively loses priority
against the naked licensee.  If there is only one licensee, then that licensee is
allowed to operate alongside the prior mark owner, irrespective of confu-
sion.163  Because the mark is invalid, the confusion is no longer at issue.164  If
there are multiple licensees and the licensor loses its priority through naked
licensing, there will be no singular surviving licensee, and potential competi-
tors offering nearly fungible products in relatively close markets will be left to
distinguish themselves in other ways.165  In both cases, if the fundamental
assumption regarding naked licensing is correct, then the failure of the licen-
sor to engage in quality control by definition leads to divergent output that
will—by definition—confuse consumers.
The view of trademark forfeiture embodied in most of these forfeiture
mechanisms and encoded in a narrow reading of the statute—that forfeiture
is by and large determined only by mark owner behavior—might be proper
in a world where the creation and maintenance of trademark meaning is
dependent only on mark owner behavior.  But as Part II explains, such a
regime would be inconsistent with the information-transmission goals that a
properly functioning trademark system should seek to meet, in part because
they ignore the critical role of consumers in creating trademark meaning
and source significance.
II.  CONSUMER PERCEPTION AND TRADEMARK MEANING
A superficial look at the current forfeiture mechanisms suggests that
those mechanisms preserve the information-transmission function of trade-
marks.  But a deeper look suggests that the abandonment and naked licens-
ing mechanisms operate in a manner inconsistent with the information-
transmission function of trademarks because they fail to account for con-
sumer perception of residual goodwill.  Insights from linguistic theory and
property scholarship help refine the application of information-transmission
and search cost justifications to trademark forfeiture.
A. Standard Justifications for Forfeiture Mechanisms
Trademarks should be protected to the extent necessary to ensure that
they convey valuable information to the public.  The forfeiture mechanisms
evolved with the stated goals of preventing consumer confusion and preserv-
ing a competitive commercial marketplace (in part by discouraging ware-
163 Cf. Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir.
1980) (allowing two competitors racing for priority over the mark Kimberly for women’s
sweaters to share the market, with the expectation that stylistic differences in labels would
suffice to prevent confusion among sophisticated consumers).
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007).
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housing of marks and encouraging entry).166  The standard justifications for
forfeiture mechanisms are unsatisfying, but the underlying rationale is not
entirely indefensible.  Unfortunately, the mechanisms fall short of those
goals in many ways.
1. Trademark Warehousing and the Public Domain
Trademark’s abandonment mechanism aims to prevent warehousing—
ownership and control of a mark that the owner does not use.167  Instead an
abandoned mark may be reused—even for the same category of product
offered by the former owner.168  Admittedly, if the primary focus of trade-
mark law is properly centered on preventing warehousing and promoting the
return of unused marks to the public domain, then focusing solely or even
primarily on mark owner behavior in the forfeiture context might be
appropriate.169
But maximizing the number of words in the public domain for subse-
quent appropriation may not be the proper focus of trademark law.  In the
copyright and patent regimes, a large public domain is critical, so the appro-
priator of ideas and creations can build on, repurpose, and repackage public
domain goods in ways likely to reduce the cost to consumers of acquiring the
goods.170  The end of the protection is a key part of those regimes, allowing
authors and inventors to build on prior innovation or sell goods embodying
public domain expression and inventions without paying former rights
holders.171
166 See Strahilevitz, supra note 102, at 391.
167 See Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising out of the Use of “WWW.Trademark.Com”: The
Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 455, 467 (1997) (“One cannot simply create ‘catchy’ marks, not use them and then
assert them against the users.  In order to maintain rights in a mark, the trademark owner
must maintain the mark’s usage in connection with goods and/or services.”); David S.
Ruder, The Fallacy of Trademark Residual Goodwill, 22 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 4, 6 (2003)
(arguing that warehousing would “deprive those same consumers of the benefits of new
product choices and lower prices in the marketplace”).
168 See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Rather
than countenancing the ‘removal’ or retirement of the abandoned mark from commercial
speech, trademark law allows it to be used by another.”); see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini,
Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2007).
169 See, e.g., Stanley A. Bowker, Jr., Note, The Song Is Over but the Melody Lingers On:
Persistence of Goodwill and the Intent Factor in Trademark Abandonment, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
1003, 1016 (1988) (“[If] the procompetition policy is viable it obviously cuts in the direc-
tion of finding against the trademark owner and in favor of the competitor charging aban-
donment.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 102, at 391 (“When a trademark falls into disuse, there
is no longer any justification for impoverishing the public domain, however slightly, so the
mark is returned to the commons where it can be appropriated by any other firm that
wishes to use it in commerce.”).
170 See Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 585, 622 (2011).
171 While IP rights persist, new entrants hoping to avoid liability for infringement must
either innovate around those rights or pay to license them.  Christopher Buccafusco et al.,
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On the other hand, a trademark is an information-transmission tool that
the seller of a product can use to communicate information about the source
and quality of the product to a consumer.  Where consumers invest a mark
with trademark meaning, allowing a competitor to use the mark will often
increase consumer search costs.172  In addition, as discussed in more detail in
Section III.B, this use of a mark with residual consumer goodwill is also likely
to impose costs on competitors and degrade the value of the mark to trans-
mit useful information more generally.173
2. Trademark Forfeiture and Consumer Search Costs
Individual forfeiture mechanisms often come under fire for counting
mark owner behavior but discounting consumer perception.174  For exam-
ple, critiques of the abandonment mechanism grounded in the search-cost
rationale propose adjusting the abandonment standard,175 or the breadth of
remedies allowed an ostensibly forfeiting mark owner.176  Some go so far as
to suggest that any appropriation of an abandoned mark that retains residual
goodwill is “almost certain” to confuse and deceive consumers.177
Scholars also differ about whether prohibitions on naked licensing and
assignments in gross “unambiguously lower consumer search costs,”178 pre-
The Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2902937.
172 See supra notes 33 & 44 and accompanying text; see also Dogan & Lemley, Limiting
Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1224–26.
173 See also Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 834 (2005) (observing that strict enforcement of the assign-
ment in gross rule can make it more difficult for entrants to replace firms which are ready
to exit).
174 See, e.g., 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 17:15 (“[I]t is error to give greater weight to
the non-us[ing mark owner’s] subjective intent than to the marketplace perception of cus-
tomers.”); Note, supra note 93, at 696 (relying on mark owner intent to determine when a
mark is abandoned requires embracing a “formalistic ‘property’ theory of trade-marks”).
175 Bowker, supra note 169, at 1020–22 (arguing that the drafters of the Lanham Act
did not intend to distinguish intent to abandon from intent not to resume use, and the
reading of section 45 by the court in Exxon focuses on protecting the interest of the com-
petitor alleging abandonment, rather than preventing consumer confusion).
176 See Michael S. Denniston, Residual Good Will in Unused Marks—the Case Against Aban-
donment, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 615, 643 (2000).
177 Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Zombie Trademark: A Windfall and a
Pitfall, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1280, 1300 (2008); cf. Denniston, supra note 176, at 649 (pro-
posing that a mark should not be deemed abandoned until residual goodwill “drops to an
insignificant level”); Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks—Why the Anti-Assign-
ment in Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as Collateral, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 465, 469 (1998). But see Jonathan B. Schwartz, Comment, Less Is More: Why a Prepon-
derance Standard Should Be Enough for Trademark Abandonment, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1345,
1363–64 (2009) (arguing that courts set too high a bar to clear before determining that a
mark owner who has suspended use does not intend to resume use).
178 Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1224, 1232–36. Contra Carter,
supra note 92, at 786 (arguing that forfeiture for assignment in gross increases consumer
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vent consumer deception,179 or cause consumer confusion.180  It is more
likely that the current assignment in gross mechanism imposes fewer search
costs than naked licensing precisely because courts consider both assignor
inputs (the transfer of goodwill) and assignee outputs (quality of the
assignee’s marked product) in determining whether to forfeit the mark for
assignment in gross.  In naked licensing cases, courts focus on the mark
owner’s quality control procedures, which does not guarantee any level of
output quality, but merely establishes that the mark owner has jumped
through one fairly broad hoop to avoid forfeiture.181  Even scholars who
express confidence that discouraging assignments in gross and naked licens-
ing will result in lower consumer confusion in the long term concede that
forfeiture likely exacerbates confusion in the short term.182
These fragmentary appraisals of forfeiture mechanisms recognize the
importance of consumer perception, but the individual accounts are unsatis-
fying for two reasons.  First, they fail to take a holistic view of forfeiture mech-
anisms.  Second, their attention to consumer perception is undertheorized.
It is a given that trademark law historically pays lip service to consumer per-
ception and consumer harm.
This Article fills that gap in part by providing two justifications for the
central role of the consumer in igniting and extinguishing trademark mean-
ing.  As Section II.B explains, focusing on mark owner behavior in assessing
forfeiture ignores the critical role that consumers play in creating and shap-
search costs); Johnston, supra note 131, at 26–27 (same); Landes & Posner, supra note 90,
at 285 (same); Noah D. Genel, Note, Keep It Real: A Call for a Broader Quality Control Require-
ment in Trademark Law, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 291 (1997) (argu-
ing that forfeiture for naked licensing increases search costs); Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment,
The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to
Police Their Licensees and Why This Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities and the
Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361, 373 n.80 (2005) (“[D]enial of
trademark protection increases search costs more than naked licensing ever could.”).
179 Kuss, supra note 178, at 384 (“[T]rademark protection is no longer justified when a
trademark deceives consumers more than it reduces search costs.”).
180 See Comment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1188 (1963) (“[A]ssuming that the consumer cannot be deceived in a controlled
licensing arrangement since he seeks only an assurance of quality . . . [may] oversimplif[y]
purchaser response to different classes of products.”).
181 Proposed changes to the naked licensing standard include: requiring a showing of
“deception of the public by reason of the licensor’s or licensee’s act,” Alfred M. Marks,
Trademark Licensing—Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 655 (1988);
applying a balancing test in naked licensing cases that considers both consumer deception
and loss of trademark distinctiveness, Kuss, supra note 178, at 381–85; and making a direct
assessment of licensee quality before forfeiting the mark, Irene Calboli, What if, After All,
Trademarks Were “Traded in Gross”?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 345, 347.
182 See Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1240. But see Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV.
611, 729–30 n.446 (1999) (“[T]he policy warranting denial of protection [in cases of
naked licensing and assignment in gross] is the avoidance of consumer deception that
those activities engender.”).
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ing trademark meaning.  Section II.C then describes how discounting con-
sumer perception in the forfeiture context may distort the scope of
trademark protection by failing to account for the importance of public com-
prehension and buy-in in any properly functioning property regime.
B. How Trademarks Add Meaning
Meaning is not created in a vacuum.  Instead, meaning is created in con-
text, and that generalization applies to trademark meaning.183  When a firm
adopts a word, design, symbol, or other indication of source for its prod-
uct(s), this new use occurs in the context of prior trademark use.  A firm may
face legal barriers when it tries to use the mark; competitors may already be
using or have used similar words for similar goods or services.  A consumer
who is familiar with prior uses of an identical or similar mark on the same or
comparable products may be confused by this new use.  The law will gener-
ally prevent the new entrant from using its mark if the incumbent can estab-
lish that consumers are likely to be confused or face significant cognitive
hurdles when attempting to process the competing uses as two different
source indicators.184  Indeed, consumer confusion is the sine qua non of
trademark infringement, and trademark litigation is designed to disclose
information about its likely occurrence.185
Trademark significance is also shaped by preexisting meanings of the
word, design, or symbol selected as the mark.  Those preexisting meanings
can channel consumer perception of the mark.  For example, some appropri-
ated words are synonymous with the product offered.  A consumer might fail
to distinguish the term from the product designation, and a competitor fac-
ing legal protection for such a term might struggle to find another way to
identify its rival product.  The law thus resists investing such a term with
trademark meaning.  Other words are unrelated to the product, and those
words may stand out as trademarks precisely because of such lack of
relationship.186
Subsequent use of the mark by consumers and competitors can further
modify the meaning(s) of the trademark.187  A speaker may appropriate
trademarks for purposes unforeseen and undesired by the firm that claims
ownership.  A competitor may engage in uses that are confusing and thus
183 In this way, a trademark is like any other symbol used to communicate. Cf. Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”).
184 See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 712.
185 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142
(9th Cir. 2011).
186 See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 728–29 (acquired distinctiveness fac-
tors “all serve as proxy evidence that the consuming public has taken notice of and imbued
the mark with source significance”).
187 Like other words, trademarks can be understood on multiple levels. See, e.g., Laura
A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1335–36 (2010).
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infringing in some situations, and in other cases descriptive of the competi-
tor’s or owner’s marks and thus noninfringing.188  These consumer uses
shape the meaning of the mark and its ability to effectively identify source
and therefore quality.  Trademark’s forfeiture mechanisms account for some
of these contextual factors that shape meaning in some cases.  But forfeiture
mechanisms too often ignore critical context to the detriment of consumers
and the ability of the market to differentiate products from different
sources.189
Linguistic theory has much to teach about trademark acquisition.190  To
summarize, acquiring source significance in a word mark requires a mark
owner to add new meaning to an existing word, or to add a new word to the
existing lexicon.  Theories of semantic shift measure how new meanings are
added to the lexicon, and how language innovators and language adopters
both contribute to the creation of that meaning.191  Understanding how
those changes occur generally can help us understand which of trademark
law’s underlying assumptions about meaning formation are more likely sup-
ported, and which are probably unjustified.
The current inquiries into abandonment through nonuse and naked
licensing are inconsistent with principles of semantic shift in their top down
approach.  An innovator, like a trademark owner, can try to add a new mean-
ing to the lexicon by using the word in a new way, but whether or not that use
catches on does not depend on the innovator.  Indeed, some linguistic inno-
vations never catch on, and are effectively meaningless to the general pub-
lic.192  These nonce formations are meaningless precisely because they are
not embraced, used, or propagated by the public.
New meanings take root only when change is embraced by an audience
beyond the initial innovator.  A change may be adopted in certain contexts
or by certain groups.  This “occasional” or contextual use may not become
widespread, but bears meaning in its community.193  Other changes become
so widespread that they can be understood outside of a particular context, or
by a large subset of the speaking population.  These “usual” formations
become central to the lexicon.194  For example, the Oxford Dictionary of
American English recently added several new slang terms to its online dic-
tionary that the editors view sufficiently in common usage to qualify for an
official entry, like “manspreading” and “hangry.”195
188 See Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 35, at 809–10.
189 See supra Section I.A.
190 Linford, Fanciful?, supra note 28, at 747–54; see Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note
28, at 1402–15.
191 See Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 28, at 1391–1401.
192 See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 131, 157.
193 For example, the author’s college friends appropriated the term B-INTO, used by a
professor to explain the flow of electromagnetic force, as a synonym for “cool.”  Most users
of B-INTO will not use it in that way, but we did.
194 Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 131.
195 Hangry, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (2017), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
us/definition/american_english/hangry (“Bad-tempered or irritable as a result of hun-
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Ending the inquiry into trademark forfeiture with mark owner behavior
is like ending the question of creation of new meaning with the first person
to use the word, rather than considering whether the word has been adopted
and how broadly.  Trademark meaning may be maintained whether or not
the mark owner takes an active hand in maintaining it.  Acting as if that
meaning has not been maintained because the initial innovator has ceased
using the term has potentially pernicious downstream effects, discussed in
Part III.  In addition, as the next Section explains, ignoring consumer per-
ception also distorts how the law defines and protects the rights extended to
mark owners.
C. Consumer Perception and Trademark Property
Property scholars like Carol Rose, Robert Ellickson, and Henry Smith
have proposed that theories of property must account for how the property
owner signals the claim to the public: the manner of claiming matters in
assessing the validity and scope of the claim precisely because the public has
a role in recognizing the property right.  A claim of right that fails to commu-
nicate with the public cannot meet its objective.  Signals must be cognizable
and consistent, and the processing costs faced by others in recognizing the
property right must be taken into account.196  For example, former or cur-
rent residents of the city of Chicago might recognize the custom by which a
person who shovels snow out of a parking space lays claim to the space by
leaving something (often a chair) in the space.  Neighbors will easily recog-
nize a chair, which has permanence, salience (because it does not otherwise
belong there), and size.  The chair is a better signal than a garbage
container, which has size and permanence, but lacks salience; a garbage
container is often left on the side of the road for pick up.  Likewise, an inter-
pretive dance is quite salient (one rarely sees one on the side of the road),
but lacks permanence.197
To the extent that a trademark is recognized as a form of property, “the
mark holder’s right to exclusive use of its mark is tempered by and depen-
dent on the perceptions of the consuming public.”198  In a way, this is conso-
ger.”); Manspreading, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (2017), http://www.oxforddictionaries.
com/us/definition/american_english/manspreading (“The practice whereby a man, espe-
cially one traveling on public transportation, adopts a sitting position with his legs wide
apart, in such a way as to encroach on an adjacent seat or seats.”).
196 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (2003) (“Because audiences of different types have different abilities to
process messages, the nature of the audience has implications for the amount and form of
the information communicated.”).
197 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of
Property Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1029 (2011) (citing
Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 7 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Property and Language]).
198 Movie Mania Metro, Inc. v. GZ DVD’s Inc., 857 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Mich. Ct. App.
2014) (“Trademark rights are thus inherently mutable because they are dependent on
whether the consuming public is able to use the mark to distinguish a good or service as
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nant with the importance of the interpretive community in construing
property rights more generally, and the signals that lay claim to those
rights.199  As Carol Rose observes, “the audience has to ‘get it.’”200  The “it”
in question is the method chosen by the property owner to convey or mani-
fest its claim.
Property rights are properly signaled by efforts that are perceptible by
and cognizable to those communities that are bound to respect them.201
Likewise, one cannot clearly evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to create
and maintain trademark meaning without considering whether the audience
for the communication perceives, comprehends, and adopts the message.202
In many contexts, trademark law properly focuses on consumers as the inter-
pretive community for claims of trademark ownership.203  Their likely confu-
sion is the focal point of disputes between owners and alleged infringers.204
Just as trademark meaning cannot be created without some evidence that
consumers should perceive the mark as a source signifier, trademark mean-
ing should not be lost without some evidence that a critical mass of consum-
ers are on notice that the change has occurred.  Nothing about the sale of a
new product under an old mark necessarily makes salient the change in pro-
ducer or product to consumers, and forfeiture mechanisms do not require
it.205  Instead, most forfeiture mechanisms discount the consumer’s central
role in this interpretive process.206
One potential side effect of ignoring the consumer in the forfeiture con-
text is that the ignorance might spread to more central trademark doctrines
used to calibrate trademark validity and scope.  Perhaps it already has.  Even
now, in considering whether a mark has acquired source significance, courts
rely heavily on mark owner behaviors (advertising expenditures, length of
originating from a particular source.”); see also Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772
F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The value of a trademark is in a sense a ‘hostage’ of
consumers; if the seller disappoints the consumers, they respond by devaluing the
trademark.”).
199 See Rose, Property and Language, supra note 197, at 6; see also Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84–85 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, Possession].
200 Rose, Property and Language, supra note 197, at 6.
201 Id. at 3; see also Rose, Possession, supra note 199, at 81–82.
202 Cf. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108
YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (1999) (recognizing the collective role consumers play in establishing
brands as cultural icons).
203 See, e.g., Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing how consumer perception shapes the likelihood of confusion
analysis in trademark infringement cases).
204 Id. at 310 (trademark infringement claim requires showing “that the contested use
of the trademark is likely to cause confusion among consumers”).
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (describing the various ways to cancel a trademark
registration).
206 See id.
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time in the marketplace) as proxies for source significance.207  Evidence of
these proxies is sometimes sufficient to overcome a lack of any evidence
about consumer perception.208  As the next Part argues, appropriation of a
forfeited mark that consumers continue to use as a source signifier may have
consequences not only for consumers, but for competitors and the market-
place as a whole.
III. FORFEITURE, APPROPRIATION, AND HARM TO CONSUMERS AND
COMPETITORS
Many of the forfeiture mechanisms are out of sync with trademark law’s
primary justification (enabling information transmission that reduces search
costs)209 and our best understanding of how meaning is created, information
is transmitted, and property is claimed.  This Part argues that allowing appro-
priation of a mark bearing residual consumer goodwill presents a significant
risk to consumers and to the market for mark-bearing products.  First, in
many cases, allowing the appropriation of a mark with residual consumer
goodwill is likely to increase consumer search costs and cause consumer
harm.210  Second, that appropriation is also likely to create distortions in the
market for the marked products that harm nonappropriating competitors.
Allowing appropriation of a mark with residual goodwill threatens to counte-
nance trade diversion from other competitors who are not freeriding on the
residual goodwill.  Third, those distortions have the potential to undermine
confidence in trademarks as source signifiers more generally.
A. Residual Goodwill and Harm to Consumers
Allowing the appropriation of a forfeited mark that retains goodwill has
the potential to harm consumers.  Trademarks ostensibly allow consumers to
more easily evaluate qualities of the good before purchase, transforming
goods with credence or experience attributes into goods with searchable
207 See, e.g., Worsham Sprinkler Co. v. Wes Worsham Fire Prot., LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d
861, 871 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[A]dvertising expenditures . . . help to establish a secondary
meaning in the minds of consumers.”).
208 See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1086 (7th
Cir. 1988) (ruling that survey evidence is useful, but not necessary, to establish secondary
meaning).
209 See Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 28, at 1690.
210 Scholars have cautioned that consumer confusion is not necessarily coterminous
with consumer harm. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 85 (2012) (“[Increased] costs [from confusion] do not
harm consumers as consumers if they do not affect purchasing behavior.”); Rebecca
Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 629 (2016)
(arguing that courts do not require mark owners to show that consumers care about the
type of confusion asserted, which may mean in some cases there is no harm even if con-
sumers are confused).
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attributes.211  Those consumers who continue to vest the mark with goodwill
will treat products offered under that mark as search goods, i.e., as if the
mark provides information about the product that it does not.
When an appropriator uses a mark that a critical mass of consumers
treats as a source signifier, the use of the mark enables the appropriator to
secure a windfall that otherwise may have gone to the original mark owner.
The appropriator secures this windfall from consumers who expect the prod-
uct with which they are familiar.  Those consumers spend money on a prod-
uct that may well dissatisfy many of them, but the current abandonment and
naked licensing inquiries do not ask what consumers might expect or
whether the appropriator provides goods of a consistent quality.212  Instead,
consumers are required to reeducate themselves based on sad experience.
But courts have properly refused to put that burden on consumers in some
assignment cases.213
Allowing appropriation of a mark with residual goodwill merely changes
the beneficiary of the lock-in effect without any benefit to consumers.
Unlearning source significance is not necessarily costless for consumers.214
In addition, goodwill, especially if it has developed into brand loyalty, can
make it more likely that disappointed consumers will endure disutility from
consuming the marked product longer than they would if the product did
not bear the appropriated mark.215  When consumers continue to invest the
mark with goodwill post-forfeiture, they are likely to experience disappoint-
ment when the trademarked product does not have expected features.  At
211 Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (by reducing search costs and allowing consumers to rely on
sellers’ signals of quality, trademarks “prevent the lemonization of markets for goods with
experience and credence attributes”).
212 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (listing conditions for when a trademark is abandoned);
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:48 (discussing the nature and effects of naked licensing).
213 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1969).  The court in
Grapette held that it was insufficient to argue that the consumer could eventually remedy its
initial confusion through sad experience with the new product.  “To say that this [injury]
would be remedied by the public soon losing faith in the product fails to give the con-
sumer the protection it initially deserves.” Id.  Shahar Dillbary likewise identifies some
cases where marks acquire a “secondary descriptive meaning,” and argues that selling prod-
ucts that do not meet that description under the mark may defraud the public.  J. Shahar
Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 327, 339–41, 346
(2009) (arguing that the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B),
should be read broadly enough to cover intrabrand misrepresentation).
214 Giovanni B. Ramello, What’s in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20 J.
ECON. SURVEYS 547, 558–59 (2006) (suggesting that brand loyalty increases switching costs,
which has the effect of locking in consumers and preventing some entry).  Literature on
switching costs refers to these costs as learning costs.  Paul Klemperer, Markets with Con-
sumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. ECONOMICS 375, 375 (1987) [hereinafter Klemperer, Switch-
ing Costs].  Firms seem to presume that switching costs will preserve custom; they tend to
charge lower prices in markets with low switching costs. Id. at 384.
215 See Ramello, supra note 214, at 558–59.
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the extreme, the use of a mark may lead consumers to repeatedly seek satis-
faction from a trademarked product unlikely to provide it.
That is not to say every consumer will be harmed by the appropriation,
even if a significant subset of consumers invests the mark with residual good-
will.  Indeed, some consumers will be satisfied with the appropriator’s prod-
uct.  But the subset of consumers who benefit from the appropriation may be
rather small.  Consumers who are looking for Coca-Cola’s Surge, find a com-
petitor’s Surge, and are happy with it, will likely be happy either because the
appropriator’s product is of sufficiently high quality or because they do not
care much about quality anyway.  But for consumers who are not looking for
Surge but are happy with the appropriator’s product, the appropriation was
likely unnecessary.216  There is little advantage to the quality-unconscious
consumer, but significant potential disadvantage for the quality conscious,
brand-loyal consumer.  On the other hand, the appropriation of a forfeited
mark could nevertheless benefit society if a significant portion of the con-
suming population does not invest the mark with residual goodwill.
B. Residual Goodwill and Harm to Competitors
Harm to consumers is not the only cost of ignoring residual goodwill:
some of the money the consumer spends on the appropriator’s product
might instead have been spent on the products of other competitors in the
marketplace.  Thus, some of the windfall secured by the appropriator is not
diverted from the forfeiting mark owner, but from other competitors.  The
appropriator takes advantage by using a mark that continues to bear goodwill
that consumers have invested in the mark.  Indeed, at least in some abandon-
ment cases, there is no product offered by the former mark owner, and thus
no diversion from that mark owner at all.217  The stronger the residual con-
sumer goodwill, the more market share that the appropriator can command,
and the more difficulty competitors will have communicating with consumers
and competing with the appropriator.
216 If there are a broad selection of marks from which a mark owner can choose, see,
e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 90, at 289, then any mark will do, and the benefit to this
subset of consumers does not justify the appropriation. Contra Barton Beebe & Jeanne
Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Deple-
tion (unpublished draft on file with author).
217 Cf. McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 35, at 1893 (“Traditional trademark
law . . . was concerned with consumer confusion . . . because a competitor could use such
confusion to divert a mark owner’s trade. . . . [C]ontinuing goodwill is entirely immaterial.
Absent intent to serve its former market, a party cannot claim its sales will be diverted by
the defendant’s use; the former mark owner has no sales (and will have no sales) to divert.
Thus, even if consumers continued to associate a mark with one party, traditional trade-
mark law would not have found a violation because the former owner’s property was ‘in no
wise interfered with.’” (quoting Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co.,
201 F. 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1912))).
 2017] valuing  residual  goodwill 847
TABLE 1: WINDFALL TO APPROPRIATOR POST-ABANDONMENT, WHERE
CONSUMERS STILL PERCEIVE THE MARK AS A SIGNIFIER OF THE
ORIGINAL SOURCE.
 
Mark  
Owner 
Appropriator  
(enters  
post-forfeiture)
Competitors  
(four total) 
Time 1: 
Pre-forfeiture 
20 0 20 [5 each] 
Time 2, Option 1: 
Post-forfeiture  
(no appropriation) 
0 4 36 [9 each] 
Time 2, Option 2: 
Post-forfeiture  
(with appropriation) 
0 20 20 [5 each] 
As Table 1 shows, appropriation of a mark bearing residual consumer
goodwill may convey a significant advantage to the appropriator over compet-
itors.  Table 1 posits a prior owner with a significant market share in a given
product category.  The mark owner makes fifty percent of the sales in a given
period of time (twenty units), and the next four competitors split the other
fifty percent of sales in the market (another twenty units).
Imagine two simple post-forfeiture regimes.  In the first, no one appro-
priates the forfeited mark.  The new entrant finds a word not used as a mark
in that product category, or coins a new word as a mark, and begins compet-
ing with the remaining incumbents.  Assuming that former customers of the
abandoned mark have no preexisting experience with any replacement prod-
uct, the custom will likely be split five ways.  The new entrant will earn four
units, and the incumbents will split the other sixteen units.  The simplified
hypothetical presumes roughly fungible quality between the various competi-
tors and relaxing that assumption would complicate the example.218  In a
system where a forfeited mark could not be appropriated by a new entrant,
consumers would rely on other signals to compare products, and competitors
would be on a more level playing field.
In the second post-forfeiture regime, the new entrant is allowed to adopt
the abandoned mark with its residual goodwill.  Consumers looking for their
preferred experience will try the new entrant’s product first,219 and competi-
tors who would otherwise expect to split a value of sixteen when the aban-
218 One can also add complexity by imagining that former customers might try multiple
offerings before settling on the replacement they prefer.  Similarly, if consumers are famil-
iar with the incumbents, they might try the products of incumbents first, leaving the
entrant with a smaller share of the former mark owner’s custom.
219 Ken Bensinger, Reviving Brands That Aren’t Quite Forgotten, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/05/business/la-fi-trademark-trolls-20130106
(describing the advantage of adopting an existing mark that retains brand awareness).
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doning mark owner leaves the market will instead receive no new custom.
These assumptions may also be relaxed.  If the new entrant’s product is not
satisfactory, consumers will eventually settle on an offering from a competi-
tor.  But sales will be lost in the interim due to the appropriation of the con-
sumer goodwill invested in the forfeited mark.  And if consumers are satisfied
with the new entrant’s marked goods, they may never try those of another
competitor.220  Allowing an entrant to acquire a mark with residual goodwill
can thus distort the competitive marketplace.  The harm of confusion caused
by appropriation is borne by competitors as well as consumers.
On the other hand, an appropriator might purchase the trademark from
the former owner.  Assuming that the mark comes with the prior owner’s
trade secrets, business relationships, and perhaps even physical plants,
storefronts, and employees, consumers will have a relatively consistent con-
sumer experience through the shift in ownership and benefit.  In such a case,
the appropriator should benefit from the consumer goodwill accrued by the
mark owner;221 the appropriator is paying for it and, in many cases, acquir-
ing resources that make it likely to meet consumer expectations.
Recall, however, that the law no longer forfeits protection when an
assignment is made without the sale of physical resources.222  The analysis
above might lead us to question whether weakening the bar against assign-
ment in gross is well advised.  The old assignment in gross rule was aimed at
preserving consumer expectations after a trademark sale.  If the purchase
price includes physical plants or other embodiments of the prior owner’s
goodwill, it is less likely that the assignee will take the trademark and try to
pass off inferior or maladapted goods likely to confuse consumers.  A propo-
sal for encouraging assignees to buy relevant production infrastructure fol-
lows in Section V.C.
C. Residual Goodwill and Harm to the Market
Allowing frequent appropriation of residual goodwill also poses poten-
tial harms to the information-transmission function of trademarks, and thus a
functioning market for marked products, in a more general sense.  First, if
consumers have multiple experiences with trademarks that fail to fulfill their
information-transmission function, the failure devalues not only the original
mark owner’s brand, but the information-transmission value of marks.  Con-
sumers who are repeatedly disappointed will be less confident in relying on a
trademark as a heuristic for source and quality.  The efficiency of relying on
220 This depends in part on how price-sensitive consumers are and on their level of
brand loyalty. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
221 At least one court has held that if the mark denotes that goods are made according
to a trade secret, the mark should receive no protection in the hands of the assignee unless
the assignee also acquires the trade secret.  Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc.,
43 F.2d 937, 939–40 (2d Cir. 1930); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 34 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 18:27; Grover C. Grismore,
The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 30 MICH. L. REV. 489, 499 (1932).
222 See supra subsection I.A.4.
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the trademark will be lost, and consumers will need to spend more time seek-
ing information about product quality from other sources.223  Lowered con-
sumer confidence may also create a feedback loop—if mark owners detect
that consumers are losing confidence in marks, they may lose confidence in
the ability to internalize the benefit of providing a consistent consumer expe-
rience.224  As mark owners spend less effort on a consistent product experi-
ence, consumers’ expectations may continue to fall.225  This sort of
downward spiral could cause market distortions.
In addition, it is not clear that, ceteris paribus, more frequent forfeiture of
marks inures to the benefit of consumers or the market.  As detailed above in
Section I.C, abandonment and naked licensing mechanisms are built on con-
flicting presumptions about consumer harm and consumer confusion.226
Those presumptions have persisted for decades, but have not been empiri-
cally tested.  Consumer preferences may run counter to how the law cur-
rently operates.  The more often a mark turns over, the more often
consumers will face relearning costs.227  If consumers are repeatedly unsatis-
fied with the product post-appropriation, it becomes less likely that relearn-
ing costs will produce the results consumers might prefer as marks become
systemically less likely to provide valuable information about quality or
source.
Forfeiture mechanisms like abandonment and naked licensing will bet-
ter meet the information-transmission goal of trademark law if they are modi-
fied to resemble the generislide mechanism and make a more direct inquiry
into consumer perception.  Two means of accomplishing that goal are dis-
cussed below.  Part IV proposes a framework to guide courts in determining
whether the residuum of goodwill in a forfeited mark is large enough to
impact competition in the market.  Part V offers an administrative option,
using auction theory to improve information forcing in the forfeiture
context.
223 See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text.  The problem is most acute for con-
sumers of experience and credence goods, those goods where quality is not readily observ-
able but trademarks arguably fill the gap.  Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition
and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973); Katz, supra note 212, at
1560–61; Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 729 (1974).
224 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
225 Cf. Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 841–42 (2016)
(describing a similar feedback loop that degrades patent examination).
226 But see Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 28, at 1710 n.119 (noting the
positive economic case for free alienability, but arguing that it is much weaker vis-a`-vis
trademarks because “the asset is only supposed to exist in connection with particular goods
made by a particular manufacturer”).
227 See Klemperer, Switching Costs, supra note 214, at 375.
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IV. CHANGING THE FORFEITURE INQUIRY TO ACCOUNT FOR CONSUMER
GOODWILL
Courts can adjust the forfeiture inquiry to take consumer perception
and residual goodwill into account without violating the relevant provisions
of the Lanham Act.  As discussed above, a surface reading of the Lanham Act
pushes us toward a mark-owner-driven view of forfeiture.228  But that reading
is inconsistent with a proper understanding of the role of consumers in creat-
ing and maintaining trademark meaning.229  While an amendment to the
language of the Act would clarify the ability of courts to directly consider the
consumer perspective in forfeiture cases, reading the statute in light of its
construction provides space for courts to consider consumer perception
when applying the forfeiture provisions.
A. Reading Consumer Goodwill Back into the Lanham Act
The statutory language dealing with generislide, naked licensing, and
assignment in gross already embodies some consumer-facing terminology.  A
mark becomes “the generic name for the goods or services”230 when consum-
ers use the mark as a generic product designation.  Properly understood,
generislide should have little, if anything, to do with mark owner activity—
either the majority of consumers see the mark as a source signifier, or they
see it as a generic designation.231  While section 1127(2) does not explicitly
so state as a textual matter, the provision governing the cancellation of trade-
mark registrations, section 1064(3), explains that “[t]he primary significance
of the registered mark to the relevant public . . . shall be the test for deter-
mining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods
or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”232  Likewise,
the language in section 1127(2) that triggers forfeiture on the loss of “signifi-
228 See supra subsection I.A.1.
229 See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
230 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
231 Couching generislide in terms of mark owner conduct suggests that the mark owner
can stop the process.  Thus, we see mark owners like Xerox Corporation fight pitched
battles in the press and with lexicographers to forestall generic uses of the Xerox trade-
mark.  As early as 1966, the Oxford English Dictionary included a generic usage of Xerox
for the output of a photocopy machine. See Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative
Writing: Genericide or Language Right?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 253, 260 (Lisa Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999).  In
addition, the law may unintentionally incentivize aggressive policing because the costs of
generislide are so high.  Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 37, at 1243.
232 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); see also, e.g., Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 247 F. Supp.
2d 822, 826 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d sub nom., 364 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2004) (“A party seeking
cancellation of a trademark registration bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that, in the minds of the consuming public, the significance of the regis-
tered term is the general class of product.”).
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cance as a mark”233 raises the question, significance from whose
perspective?234
The provision on abandonment through nonuse, section 1127(1), does
not include references to genericness or significance as a mark.235  It is thus
tempting to read out any consideration of consumer perception from that
provision.  As argued above,236 however, reading out the consumer perspec-
tive creates distortions that not only harm consumers, but also threaten to
upset the competitive model embraced by our trademark laws, which protect
marks because and to the extent they correctly identify product from a con-
sistent source.  In addition, the forfeiture provisions are close statutory neigh-
bors.  Courts frequently read statutory and constitutional provisions
contextually, in light of the relevant provision’s broader purposes.237  Read-
ing the consumer perspective out of the provision on abandonment under-
mines the statutory regime.  A holistic reading of the forfeiture provisions in
light of the Lanham Act’s purpose to protect mark owners, consumers, and
competitive infrastructure, gives courts sufficient room to directly consider
residual consumer goodwill in the forfeiture context.  The next Section pro-
vides a structure for that more focused inquiry.
B. Reforming Forfeiture Mechanisms to Account for Residual Goodwill
This Article argues that a mark should not be forfeited for abandonment
through nonuse, naked licensing, or assignment in gross unless the forfeiture
is less likely to harm consumers and distort competition than the preserva-
tion of trademark rights.  Under the current forfeiture provisions, appropria-
tion is costless; the forfeiting mark owner cannot prevent the appropriation.
The law thus lacks a mechanism to force the appropriator to internalize the
harm caused to consumers, competitors, or the marketplace.
Note that this inquiry cuts both ways.  It is likely that there are cases
where a court finds a mark valid in the face of a charge of assignment in gross
because the court fails to account for confusing differences between the
assignor’s mark-bearing product and that of the assignee.238  The same may
233 15 U.S.C. § 1127, “abandoned”.
234 See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(“[In light of a] vast inventory of products sold by innumerable sources, the image of
Princess Diana on a product provides consumers with no suggestion that the product is
associated with her, the Estate or the Fund.  Her image has truly lost any significance as a
mark identifying the source of a product.”).
235 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
236 See supra Part III.
237 See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1129 (2016) (reading the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause in light of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and concluding that “[i]t cannot be that the Fourteenth Amendment calls for the appor-
tionment of congressional districts based on total population, but simultaneously prohibits
States from apportioning their own legislative districts on the same basis”).
238 See supra subsection I.A.4.
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be true in many cases where the claim of naked licensing would otherwise be
rebutted because of the existence of minimal quality control provisions.239
An investigation into residual goodwill should occur during an opposi-
tion proceeding or a petition to cancel a registration grounded on forfeiture.
The inquiry would also arise when a defendant to an action for trademark
infringement claims forfeiture as a defense.240  One could even imagine the
former owner of a forfeited mark bringing an action for false association,
particularly in light of recent cases that recognize the right to bring such a
claim even if the claimant lacks trademark rights.241
The goal of modifying forfeiture inquiries is not to take questions of
mark owner omission or commission out of the equation, but instead to con-
sider consumer investment of goodwill, consistent with the information-trans-
mission function of trademarks.  A direct inquiry into residual consumer
goodwill in the forfeiture context is preferable to accounting for it indirectly
by way of the mark owner’s intent to resume use, or the formal existence of
quality control measures.  Even with the existing flaws in consumer surveys,
evidence of consumer perception is at least an equal, if not better, proxy of
source significance and trademark meaning.  While a direct inquiry into con-
sumer confusion is costlier than assuming consumers are confused by certain
mark owner behaviors, the cost is not particularly high.  Indeed, courts
already collect similar evidence of consumer perception in generislide
cases.242
In addition, an inquiry into consumer perception is more likely to
reflect actual consumer perception than the judge’s best guess on the sub-
ject.243  Courts currently chip at the edges of residual consumer goodwill in a
handful of cases where the likely residuum is obvious, but cloak the inquiry
in terms of mark owner behavior.244  Even if a judge or jury is doing no more
than echolocating between competing evidentiary offerings by the litigating
parties, survey evidence can provide a helpful way to anchor the discussion.
239 See supra subsection I.A.5.
240 This action could arise under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) for registered marks or 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) for unregistered marks.
241 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1390 (2014) (holding that lost sales and damages to business reputation are injuries that
fall within the zone of interests protected by the false advertising provision of the Lanham
Act); Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 706 (4th Cir. 2016) (recog-
nizing foreign mark owner’s right to bring false association and false advertising claims
even though the mark owner has no rights in the United States).
242 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
243 Cf. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J.,
dissenting) (noting, in a dispute over whether “Seventeen” for girdles infringed “Seven-
teen” for a magazine for teen girls, that “[a]s neither the trial judge nor any member of
this court is (or resembles) a teen-age girl or the mother or sister of such a girl, our judicial
notice apparatus will not work well unless we feed it with information directly obtained
from ‘teen-agers’ or from their female relatives accustomed to shop for them”).
244 See, e.g., Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843, 1849 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
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Taking a direct look at residual consumer goodwill will also discipline judicial
inquiry and reduce error in outlier cases where a court is tempted to pre-
sume, after taking judicial notice of the state of the market, that some
residual goodwill must exist.
Table 2, in the appendix, provides structure for an inquiry into residual
goodwill and consumer confusion in forfeiture cases.  Table 2 provides a
decision chart for distinguishing consumers likely to be harmed by the
appropriation of the forfeited mark from consumers unlikely to be harmed.
The following discussion explains the process a court could undertake in dis-
tinguishing harmful from nonharmful use, whether by the assignees and
licensees of the mark owner, or by the appropriator of the ostensibly aban-
doned mark.  Table 2 presents the inquiry in the form of a decision tree with
a series of offramps.  At each stage in the inquiry, the court could conclude,
based on the evidence presented, that there is no likely consumer confusion
or harm.  The following factors would provide courts with important gui-
dance on that point:
1. Does the Use of the Mark Affect the Purchasing Decision?
There is no harm (and no benefit) from appropriation for that subset of
consumers who made purchasing decisions unaffected by the appropriated
mark.  On the other hand, for consumers who selected the good (or service)
in part because they were attracted by the appropriated mark, there is a
potential for significant harm via confusion.
2. Does the Consumer Think the Marked Goods Come from Source 1,
the Original Mark Owner?
If the appropriation of the mark influences a consumer’s purchasing
decision (Question 1), and if the consumer sees the mark as signifying
Source 1—the forfeiting prior mark owner (Question 2)—then the residual
consumer goodwill in the appropriated mark may lead the consumer to
make a purchase that is otherwise less likely to be made.  This confusion is no
different from the consumer confusion that triggers liability in trademark
disputes in standard trademark cases.245  The difference is that in forfeiture
cases, courts typically ignore the question.246
On the other hand, if the consumer does not think the marked goods
come from Source 1, then something other than trademark confusion must
be driving the effect of the mark on the purchasing decision.  For example,
the mark might be desirable for reasons other than utility as a source signi-
fier.  If that is the case, any confusion or harm to that consumer is likely to be
minimal or irrelevant.
245 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
246 See supra subsections I.A.3–I.A.5.
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3. Are the Marked Goods the Same as Goods from Source 1?
If the marked goods from Source 2 are essentially the same as goods
from Source 1, then there may be no harm to any consumer, even if some
consumers would feel deceived.  On the other hand, inconsistent quality
might well harm consumers who are expecting goods from Source 1 and do
not get them.  In effect, this is the intuition that undergirds the once-robust
rule that a mark is forfeited if assigned in gross.247  The rule against assign-
ment in gross presumes that the mark transferred without underlying good-
will (and really, goodwill as used in the traditional assignment case should
include those things that make the marked good desirable, including, per-
haps, physical facilities, trade secrets, and access to essential resources) will
inevitably confuse consumers.  Thus, in the occasional assignment in gross
case, forfeiture could be avoided if the purchaser’s goods were effectively the
same quality as the seller’s goods.
The same presumption underlies the bar on naked licensing.  Thus, the
naked licensing mechanism should take quality of the licensee’s products
into account.  Unfortunately, it does not.248  But if a naked or uncontrolled
licensee produces goods that are the same as, fungible with, or otherwise
satisfactory when compare to goods directly from Source 1, there is no harm.
4. Is the Consumer Happy with the Marked Goods; i.e., Are the Marked
Goods from Source 2 Fungible with Goods from Source 1?
It is also possible that a consumer who mistakenly purchases goods from
Source 2 bearing the appropriated mark is satisfied with the goods even
though they do not match the quality of goods from Source 1.  That con-
sumer may not have been harmed, although that question may depend in
part on whether goods from Source 2 are objectively and/or subjectively fun-
gible with goods from replacement sellers.  The proportion of dissatisfied
consumers should be no bigger than the subset of consumers who still vest
the mark with goodwill or treat the mark as a source signifier and see the
appropriator’s product as a quality mismatch.  For consumers who do not
care one way or the other, appropriation has no effect.  On the other hand, a
consumer dissatisfied with goods from Source 2 may feel duped or deceived
by the use of the mark.  The severity of the harm from that confusion or
deceit may turn in part on the next two related questions.
5. Did the Use of the Trademark Impose Some Cost or Trigger Some
Delay on the Part of the Consumer in Trying Out or Shifting to a
Replacement Good?
Scholars have argued that advertising and/or the use of trademarks on
goods helps the mark owner instill brand loyalty in consumers, and that
brand loyalty can lead consumers to stay with a product longer than is other-
247 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., Inc., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2011).
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wise in their best interest.249  A collateral effect of this brand loyalty is that
competitors face a barrier to entry from the increased effort required to
induce a consumer to switch products.  Marketing literature evidences a pre-
occupation with the creation of brand loyalty, suggesting that marketing
experts believe brand loyalty conveys some level of market power.250  The
appropriation of a mark bearing residual goodwill thus may provide the
appropriator with an advantage in making not only an initial sale to a con-
sumer but also subsequent sales, despite some level of consumer
dissatisfaction.
6. Did the Consumer Buy or Use the Marked Goods Repeatedly?
One way to test for brand loyalty and switching costs is to ask whether
the typical consumer gives an unsatisfying product multiple tries before mov-
ing on to another alternative.  Repeated purchases of a dissatisfying product
in the hope that deviation from expectations is a momentary blip might iden-
tify a consumer who is harmed by the purchase.
The harm may actually be greatest when the appropriator offers a bad
facsimile of the original product, instead of offering something completely
different.  If the competitor offers something unlike the original (Surge root
beer), there is a lower likelihood that the use of the trademark will impose
some cost or create delay in shifting to the replacement good.  The stark
difference between the offerings might encourage consumers to shift to the
replacement good after a single attempt.  On the other hand, a bad facsimile
might actually increase the likelihood that consumers make repeated
attempts with the trademarked product in the hope that the first bad experi-
ence was an outlier.
7. Is the Marked Good of Lower Quality or Higher Price Than
Replacement Goods?
The final question is about the relative utility of the marked good com-
pared to replacement goods, measured in price and quality. Ceteris paribus, if
the appropriated mark retains residual goodwill, then the consumer may try
the marked good from Source 2 more than once before trying a replacement
good.  The harm to the consumer is the function of the number of repeat
interactions with the marked good, multiplied by the disutility of purchasing
and using the marked good, compared to a replacement good.
249 See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising Market Structure and
Performance, 49 REV. ECON. & STAT. 423, 435 (1967) (arguing that a firm must advertise
more to induce consumers to switch brands than to repeat buy because incumbents do not
incur penetration costs; those costs increase as consumers are more inert or more loyal).
But see Richard Schmalensee, Brand Loyalty and Barriers to Entry, 40 S. ECON. J. 579, 579
(1974) (“[U]nder plausible assumptions brand loyalty created by advertising is not a
source of entry barriers.”).
250 See, e.g., Arjun Chaudhuri & Morris B. Holbrook, The Chain of Effects from Brand Trust
and Brand Affect to Brand Performance: The Role of Brand Loyalty, 65 J. MARKETING 81 (2001).
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Question 7 takes a different tack than Question 4 to measure customer
satisfaction.  A satisfied consumer who stumbles across Source 2’s replace-
ment good is no more or less satisfied than one who finds Source 2’s replace-
ment good because of the appropriation of Source 1’s trademark.  Thus,
there must be some level of disutility for the consumer to be harmed.  Cor-
rectly accounting for consumer harm requires considering whether the
goods offered under the forfeited mark are of a consistent quality with those
provided by Source 1, and whether consumers rely on the mark in a way that
influences purchasing and switching decisions.  If those purchasing and
switching decisions are not affected by the residual consumer goodwill, then
harm to competitors and the market is equally unlikely.
Finally, damages should be limited to a function of the severity of the
harm experienced by consumers (how confused consumers are and how
likely they are to act on that confusion) and the likely duration of that harm
(how long residual goodwill will persist).
V. USING AUCTIONS TO DISCOVER RESIDUAL GOODWILL
As discussed above, an appropriator seeks to use a forfeited mark on
similar goods for at least two reasons.251  First, the mark may have some
inherently desirable qualities.252  Second, the appropriator anticipates that it
will obtain an advantage over competitors by using the residual consumer
goodwill in the mark.  Courts seem to intuit, in a few scattered cases, that
consumers will continue to vest a mark with residual goodwill after abandon-
ment through nonuse, although courts are forced to voice those intuitions
using unaccommodating tests to remain consistent with perceived statutory
commitments.253  The previous Part proposed an alternative test that
requires courts to articulate more explicitly their intuitions about residual
consumer goodwill.
This Part proposes using an auction mechanism to encourage the mark
owner and the appropriator to disclose their respective valuations of residual
consumer goodwill.  The primary virtue of the auction mechanism in this
context is its capacity to serve as an information-forcing mechanism.254  A
secondary virtue of this particular auction mechanism is its preference for
bidders who invest in infrastructure, resources, and relationships that
251 If the products are sufficiently dissimilar, then trademark law should not bar the
new entrant, because confusion is unlikely between dissimilar goods sold under the same
or similar marks.
252 See, e.g., Linford, Fanciful?, supra note 28, at 740 (noting that fanciful marks are
“inherently strong”); Xiyin Tang, A Phonoaesthetic Theory of Trademark Functionality
(unpublished draft on file with author).
253 See, e.g., supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 356, 369 (2001) (“A regime of mandatory auctions is strongly information
forcing.”); cf. M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auc-
tion Approach to Regulatory Assignments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1895, 1918 (2013) (“Bidding can
help reveal [bidder-specific] information, skills, or preferences.”).
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improve the bidder’s ability to meet consumer expectations.  The proposed
auction is also designed to limit opportunities for arbitrage.
A. Why Auctions?
Auction theory identifies several virtues of auction mechanisms.  Three
are particularly relevant here.  First, auctions encourage bidders to disclose
nonpublic information concerning their estimated value of the item for
sale.255  In the context of a forfeited mark, party bids will disclose both per-
ceived common value in the mark (the residual consumer goodwill) and pri-
vate value (the ability of the bidder to exploit that goodwill).256  The auction
mechanism can help reveal estimates about the amount and value of residual
goodwill remaining in a forfeited mark.  The forfeiting firm’s valuation of
residual goodwill is likely a better estimate of its perception about goodwill
than any plans to resume using the mark (the critical showing a mark owner
must make to overcome a claim of abandonment through nonuse).257  Sec-
ond, auctions will disclose information and settle property rights earlier than
litigation or administrative hearings before the USPTO.  Third, in some con-
texts, auctions are superior to a first-in-time regime for placing the thing auc-
tioned with its highest value user.258  To this end, the proposed auction
mechanism is weighted in favor of parties likely to meet consumer expecta-
tions, as described in Section V.C.
Auctions are often geared towards efficiency, i.e., putting the object in
the hands of the highest value user,259 or maximizing the seller’s expected
revenue.260  The auction proposed herein focuses on efficiency by encourag-
ing firms to disclose their respective valuations of the residual consumer
goodwill.  Correctly calibrated, the auction will increase the likelihood that
the mark ends up with the highest value user and maximize the chance that
the winner of the bid will meet consumer expectations and thus externalize
fewer costs on consumers.
255 See Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 215 (“The virtue of auctions lies in their ability to force parties to reveal
private information, thereby eliminating the incentive to negotiate strategically.”); see also
Anthony J. Casey, Auction Design for Claims Trading, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 143
(2014) (“The auction creates an incentive for sellers to reveal information, and for bidders
to competitively bid.  The bid reveals private information about their valuation.” (footnote
omitted)).  Auctions may excel in disclosing information held by buyers compared to pri-
vate information held by sellers.  Id.
256 See infra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
26–27 (2009).
259 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 35–36
(1959) (arguing that an auction for spectrum is superior to a government assignment
because in an auction the rights would go to the parties that assigned the highest value to
the resource).
260 Jay B. Kesten, Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 46, 56–57 (2015).
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One might object that if auctions are more efficient than a priority race,
perhaps every trademark should be allocated by auction.  But one key differ-
ence in the forfeiture context is that the mark to be reassigned may bear
residual, source-signifying goodwill, and that raises context specific complica-
tions outlined in the previous Parts of this Article.  In other cases, the validity
and infringement inquiries are better aimed at forcing information about
consumer perception of the marks at issue.261  Similarly, in a generislide dis-
pute, the inquiry into residual consumer goodwill also serves an information-
forcing function.262  But other forfeiture mechanisms currently fail to meet
their information-forcing functions with regard to consumer perception.
The auction can therefore provide an important corrective.
1. Acquiring Information About Residual Goodwill
Auction theory identifies two general categories of value, about which
bidders have varying information.  The object being sold may have a prima-
rily private value, idiosyncratic for each bidder.  Or the object may have a
primarily common value, where the actual value of the object sold is the same
for each bidder.263  Bidders are unlikely to have perfect information about
common value, but each bidder will have an estimate.264  In most cases, the
value of the object is neither purely private nor purely common, but rather is
interdependent.  Bidders’ values in auctions for trademark rights would also
be interdependent, including both private value and common value compo-
nents.  Residual consumer goodwill has common value; the residual goodwill
possessed by the mark would not change based on the bidder.  However,
each firm might have different capacity to profit from that residual goodwill
and make use of the mark, reflected in its subjective, private valuation.
Three entities or groups are likely to have evidence or estimates about
residual goodwill: consumers themselves, the former mark owner, and the
likely appropriator.265  The actual residual goodwill invested by each given
consumer has significance to that consumer, but may not tell us much about
the level of residual goodwill across consumers.  Collecting information from
261 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1152
(9th Cir. 2011).
262 See supra subsection I.A.1.
263 Kesten, supra note 260, at 53 (citing PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 12 (2004) [hereinafter KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS]); William Samuelson, Auctions in Theory
and Practice, in GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 295, 295–300 (Kalyan Chatterjee
& William F. Samuelson eds., 2001).
264 In a pure common value auction, the value of the auctioned item is the same for all
bidders, but if bidders do not have perfect information, some bids may overvalue the item.
See generally John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common
Value Auctions, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 894, 894 (1986) (describing literature on the “winner’s
curse”—winning with a bid that overestimates common value).
265 For the moment, let us make the simplifying assumption that there is only one likely
appropriator.  That assumption is relaxed infra. See also supra subsection I.A.5 (discussing
naked licensing).
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multiple consumers can be difficult.266  Trademark caselaw and scholarship
have documented the difficulty of securing reliable information about con-
sumer perceptions of source significance and actual consumer confusion.
Consumers are also a diffuse group—it will be difficult for consumers to
cooperate successfully in revealing their collective preferences.267
Unlike consumers with diffuse interests, the forfeiting mark owner has
no collective action problem to overcome.268  The mark owner has a singular
valuation for the mark, which reflects the likelihood that consumers will
purchase a product bearing the mark should the mark owner reintroduce it
to the market.  The forfeiting firm’s valuation of residual consumer goodwill
might depend on some or all of the following data points: the mark owner’s
sunk costs in infrastructure, resources, and relationships necessary to bring to
market products of a level consistent with consumer expectation; the
strength of the mark as reflected in the price the former mark owner could
command for the sale of its product compared to competitors’ products;
direct communication from consumers that expresses longing for the
marked product; unsolicited media coverage that indicates the value of
residual consumer goodwill in the brand; and the firm’s perspective about
the value of the mark itself as an attractive symbol for selling goods and ser-
vices independent of residual goodwill.
The potential appropriating firm will also have a value for the mark,
which includes both the firm’s perception of residual consumer goodwill and
the general attractiveness of the mark.269  The appropriating firm’s calcula-
tion will resemble that of the forfeiting firm, although the appropriating firm
is less likely to have previously invested in the infrastructure, resources, and
relationships necessary to bring a product to market that meets consumer
expectations.  Indeed, the current legal structure does not require the appro-
priating firm to take consumer preferences into account.270
We can see how price can disclose information about valuation by con-
sidering assignments and licenses.  Both the purchase price in an assignment,
and the licensing fee in a license, disclose the estimate of the parties with
regard to the value of consumer goodwill in the mark.271  To a lesser extent,
266 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
351, 360–62 (2014) (describing the costs of acquiring survey evidence in trademark cases,
and proposing that a Google search might provide an accurate picture of trademark dis-
tinctiveness as it discloses evidence of the wisdom of the crowds).
267 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (noting the general inability of diffuse groups to influence
the legislative process because it is difficult for them to organize and mobilize).
268 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated
Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 578–81 (2008).
269 See Tang, supra note 252.
270 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012).
271 Cf. Jake Linford, Essay, Unilateral Reordering in the Reel World, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1395,
1422–26 (2013) (arguing that a unilateral reordering clause should be enforceable if the
party hoping to enforce the clause makes it salient by offering the modified service or
product at two prices—a higher price without the new terms and a lower price with them).
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that price may also signal the value of the mark as a suitable name for a
product independent of goodwill.272  The assignee or licensee would not pay
the price asked by the assignor or licensor if the price was higher than the
licensee’s valuation plus profit.  And the assignor/licensor would not agree
to a price that it found too low for the value conveyed.
2. Meeting Consumer Expectations
The law does not currently require a hopeful appropriator to commit to
meeting consumer expectations.  Ideally the market will fully discipline prob-
lematic behavior, but as described in Section III.B, there are reasons to be
skeptical.  The proposed auction mechanism is instead designed to weight
the bidding process in favor of firms that signal a commitment to match con-
sumer expectations about marked products by investing in infrastructure,
resources, and relationships that make it more likely the firm will meet,
rather than disappoint, consumer expectation.273
An auction mechanism can also forestall wasteful races.  Consider Cali-
fornia Cedar Products Co. v. Pine Mountain Corp.,274 a case in which the aban-
doning firm clearly stated its plans to abandon its trademark.275  Several
competing firms raced to market, each hoping to establish priority of use
over the others.276  As in other cases, multiple firms interested in securing
rights using a first-in-time system may engage in a wasteful race.277  The auc-
tion would be preferable, sending a clearer signal about the highest value
user, and the user whose appropriation of the mark is likely to be most highly
valued by consumers.  Similarly, the auction mechanism could provide help-
ful certainty in cases wherein multiple potential registrants have some vested
rights in the mark.  For example, in a naked licensing case with multiple
preexisting licensees, an auction could help locate a replacement, rather
than leaving each competitor to engage in its own potential confusing use in
its overlapping niche.278
3. Earlier Assignment of Property Rights
A properly timed auction mechanism will encourage the forfeiting firm
to disclose its valuation of residual consumer goodwill early in the process,
compared to litigation.  Such a disclosure provides a clearer signal to hopeful
272 See Tang, supra note 252.
273 See infra Section V.C.
274 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984).
275 Id. at 829.
276 Id.
277 See Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 803, 826 (2007); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 733–36
(2003) (critiquing first possession rules generally, and specifically as a mechanism for
assigning rights to domain names).
278 See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Free-
cycle mark had been abandoned through naked licensing and thus leaving multiple for-
mer licensees to use the Freecycle mark as they see fit).
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appropriators about the owner’s valuation.279  An administrative procedure
before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board or a district court (and subse-
quent appeals) will take more time.  An auction would instead allow the win-
ning party to move forward with plans to use the mark at an earlier point,
while encouraging losing parties to move in another direction.
B. The Auction Mechanism
Auctions are frequently vulnerable to strategic bidding.  Depending on
the structure of the auction, a party may enter the auction in order to secure
a payoff from another party, rather than to acquire the auctioned object.280
Auctions can also be costly to administer.281
In the context of an auction for a forfeited mark, other potential difficul-
ties arise.  For those who argue trademark law should optimize transition of
abandoned marks to the public domain, the auction mechanism might seem
to invite arbitrage on behalf of an otherwise disinterested trademark owner
that might nevertheless prefer to reserve rights in the mark, rather than see
the mark appropriated by another party.282
The auction mechanism seeks to cabin those costs by using a sealed-bid,
second-price auction to assign rights in a forfeited mark.  The winner will pay
the value of the second highest bid to the loser or losers.283  In addition,
each bidder will be required to post a bond to enter the auction.284  Requir-
ing a bond may discourage undercapitalized parties from seeking to arbi-
279 Cf. Chiang, supra note 154, at 538–40.  Chiang argues in the patent context that
requiring the patent owner to disclose the patent through claim language upon filing pro-
vides the best information about claim scope when the patent owner is likely to have it,
without allowing the patent owner to take advantage of pending litigation and knowledge
about the defendant’s product to redraft patent claims broad enough to take advantage of
that knowledge.  A similar advantage can be garnered by moving the fight over residual
consumer goodwill earlier through the auction process.
280 See Parchomovsky, supra note 255, at 234.
281 Auctions are not necessarily costlier than other options, like property and liability
rules, and the more transparent the bidding strategy, the less costly to participate in or
operate. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Essay, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 748 (1996).
282 See Kesten, supra note 260, at 65.
283 Id. at 55 (citing KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263, at 12).
284 PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK 227–29 (2004) (noting that
prequalification of bidders reduces risks of speculative bidding).  If one is concerned that
an established mark-owning firm can always afford a larger bond than a hopeful appropria-
tor, one could require the appropriator to post a bond equal to a certain percentage of the
maximum bid.  Similar bidding credits have been shown to increase competition in other
contexts. See KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263.  One could also imagine a third party
willing to guarantee the amount of the bid, not unlike an insurance company or a livestock
bonding company.
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trage the auction and secure the second-price payout.285  As this Section
explains, the sealed-bid structure can also mitigate this sort of arbitrage.286
1. Initiating the Auction
Trademark rights (whether the mark is registered or not) can be chal-
lenged in a declaratory judgment action287 or as a defense to an action for
trademark infringement or unfair competition.288  An appropriator (or
another party that believes it will be damaged by the registration) can also
challenge a registration in a cancellation proceeding before the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, a body within the USPTO.289
The Lanham Act treats three years of nonuse as prima facie evidence
that the owner has abandoned the mark.290  The owner can rebut that pre-
sumption with evidence of a bona fide intent to resume use.291  A trademark
registration can also be cancelled292 if the registrant fails to establish contin-
ued use of the mark at regular intervals.293  These thresholds—three years of
nonuse, and the six- and ten-year renewal windows—might provide reasona-
ble windows for a hopeful appropriator to initiate an auction.  Three years of
nonuse is a decent signal that residual consumer goodwill in the mark may
have begun to dissipate.  Cancellation of a registration for failure to provide
an affidavit of continued use may also indicate that the owner plans long-
term suspension of the mark, if not outright abandonment.  Post-suspension,
it is appropriate to ask whether consumer goodwill in the mark is dissipating.
Under the proposed auction mechanism, the winning firm will receive a
six-month exclusive window to begin using the mark in commerce, if it has
285 See Parchomovsky, supra note 255, at 216 (“[H]er strategic ability to exaggerate her
valuation is capped by . . . the requirement to post a bond in [the] amount [of her bid].”).
286 See infra subsection V.B.3.
287 See, e.g., Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d
415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
288 See, e.g., Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (D. Nev. 2007), aff’d, 316 F. App’x
542 (9th Cir. 2008).
289 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012); Combs v. All Surface Entm’t, Inc., Cancellation
No. 92051490 (T.T.A.B. 2012).
290 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
291 Id. § 1051(b).
292 Trademark use and trademark registration are not coterminous; in the United
States, trademark protection is grounded in use, rather than registration. See Linford,
Adverse Possessor, supra note 20, at 717.
293 See, e.g., Official Gazette Notice of Cancellation for Failure to File a Section 8 Decla-
ration of Continued Use, STARBURST, Registration No. 3,177,483 (cancelled Aug. 13,
2013).  The owner of a trademark registration must file an affidavit of continuing use after
the first six years of registration, and then every ten years, to retain the registration.  15
U.S.C. § 1058.  The USPTO grants a six-month grace period after the filing deadline if the
registrant pays an additional fee. Id.
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not already commenced use.294  Like the intent-to-use application on which
it is modeled, the deadline could be extended.295
The proposed auction mechanism could instead require a bidder to use
the mark in commerce prior to bidding, but a use requirement to qualify to
bid is problematic for at least two reasons.  First, the forfeiting mark owner
might be barred from bidding if the mark is currently not in use, even
though the mark retains residual goodwill.  Second, as discussed in subsec-
tion V.B.3 below, the auction mechanism limits arbitrage in part by encour-
aging multiple firms to bid for the mark.  If parties must race to use the
ostensibly forfeited mark in commerce, the process may block otherwise-via-
ble bidders from the market.
2. Administering the Auction
The USPTO would administer the auction, as it already handles trade-
mark forfeiture cases.  It regularly rules on petitions to cancel registrations
on grounds of abandonment,296 assignment in gross,297 or generislide.298  In
addition, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, a body within the USPTO,
already handles inter partes proceedings directly challenging the validity of a
registration on nonuse or generislide grounds.299
The auction would not be costless.  However, running a static sealed-bid
auction should save the USPTO some administrative costs compared to a
dynamic auction.300  In addition, the auction can include a premium for the
USPTO.301  Auction fees could be handled in one of two ways.  The winning
bidder could pay the entire premium as a percentage of the winning bid.  Or
each bidder could pay an administrative cost up front, in addition to the
bonded bid amount.
294 The six-month window is similar to the six months allowed an intent-to-use appli-
cant to file an affidavit of use.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b), (d); 1057(c).
295 That deadline can be extended up to three years. Id. § 1051(d).
296 See, e.g., Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1025 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
297 See, e.g., Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
298 See, e.g., Informix Software, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
299 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 158 n.18 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The Trademark
Board’s primary function is to determine whether trademarks are registerable and to con-
duct opposition and cancellation proceedings by which interested parties can dispute the
claims of applicants and registrants.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1051; §§ 1063–64)).
300 See MILGROM, supra note 284, at 10; see also infra subsection V.B.3.
301 Auction houses often charge a buyer’s premium—a predetermined percentage
fee—for administering the auction.  An auction premium is typically included in English
auctions. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEO-
RIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS & LIFE 308 (2008).
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3. Structuring the Auction to Limit Arbitrage
Unfortunately, auctions can provide opportunities for arbitrage.  For
instance, imagine that the Surge registrants were not interested in launching
a new Surge brand, but instead hoped to secure rights in Surge and sell the
brand back to Coca-Cola or a competitor.  The registrant might bid more
than its subjective value in the hope that the winner will be required to pay
out higher value.  Indeed, a similar arbitrage opportunity arose with domain
name registration; many early registrations were secured by non–mark own-
ers using a trademark as the top level domain.302
The proposed auction mechanism seeks to mitigate the threat of arbi-
trage in two ways.  First, each bidder will be required to post a bond in the
value of the bid.303  In an auction with two bidders, the bond itself limits
opportunities for arbitrage: if a bidder cannot play without securing a guar-
antee that it can pay the price should it win, then it stands to reap a limited
reward if it bids over its actual valuation.
Second, the auction mechanism is second-price, with a sealed bid, a
structure that is more likely to encourage multiple bidders.304  Auctions can
be organized in several different ways.305  An auction may be dynamic
(changing price—typically open bid) or static (one price—typically sealed
bid); and first-price (winner pays the value it bids) versus second-price (win-
ner pays the value of the next highest bid).306  The most familiar dynamic
auction structure is the ascending-bid or English auction.307  In an English
auction, the parties successively raise bids.308  The winning bidder is the last
to bid, and she pays the value of her top bid.309
Sealed-bid auctions are static, rather than dynamic.  In a sealed-bid auc-
tion, each party submits a bid without knowing the bids of competing bid-
ders.310  Sealed-bid auctions thus do not disclose each party’s valuation until
after the bidding is complete.  Sealed-bid auctions come in two varieties: first-
price sealed-bid auctions, where the winner pays the value of its bid,311 and
302 Parchomovsky, supra note 255.
303 If one is concerned that an established mark-owning firm can always afford a larger
bond than a hopeful appropriator, one could require the appropriator to post a bond
equal to a certain percentage of the maximum bid.
304 See MILGROM, supra note 284, at 10 (“[An auction] presents each bidder with a sim-
ple strategic bidding problem . . . .  [T]here is no need for any bidder to make estimates of
the number of other bidders or their values, for those have no bearing on a rational bid-
der’s optimal bid.”).
305 See Kesten, supra note 260, at 52.
306 Id. at 54–55.
307 Id. at 54.
308 See id.
309 See id. (citing KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263, at 11).  A dynamic auction can
also work in reverse.  In a descending bid or Dutch auction, the auctioneer opens the
bidding at a high price, and the bid is lowered until one bidder accepts.  The winning
bidder pays the accepted price. Id.
310 Id. (citing KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263, at 12).
311 See id. at 54–55 (citing KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263, at 12).
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second-price sealed-bid auctions, or Vickrey auctions,312 where the winner
pays the value of the next highest bid.313
Compared to an English auction, a less capitalized bidder is more likely
to compete in a sealed-bid auction.314  In an English auction, a well-capital-
ized bidder can use the open disclosure of bids to reassess its valuation and
increase its bid.315  Weak or less capitalized bidders are thus discouraged
from bidding, because the well-capitalized bidder can respond to the disclo-
sure.316  There is no disclosure to tip the hand of well-capitalized bidders in a
sealed-bid auction.317
A sealed bid is also preferable in part because multiple bidders will
decrease the likelihood of arbitrage because the winning bid will be divided
between the remaining bidders.  A strategic bidder in a two-bidder auction
might estimate the mark’s common value at $10,000 and bid $9,900, hoping
not to win the mark but to secure the loser’s payout.  But in an auction with
multiple bidders, the payout will be divided among all losers.  For example,
Firm A contemplates entering an auction for a forfeited mark seeking to
benefit from the payoff but does not value the mark and does not want to use
the mark in commerce.  Firm A estimates that Firm B values the mark at
$10,000.  Firm A bids $9,900, hoping to secure a payoff of $9,900.  But Firm
A must post a bond for the privilege of bidding.  In addition—and to Firm
A’s dismay—Firm B enters the auction as well.  Now Firm A has bonded a
$9,900 bid to split the payoff with another bidder.  If Firm A anticipates this
risk, it is unlikely to bid unless it truly values the mark at $9,900, or unless it
can secure a $9,900 bond at a cost that makes a payoff of $4,450 (or less)
worthwhile.318  Thus, in cases with more than two bidders, the primary incen-
tive for bidding should be securing the trademark, rather than driving up the
price of the trademark to secure the payment.  Combined, these features
should limit the incentive to engage in arbitrage.
The simple auction outlined above may not meet the other goal of the
project: encouraging a fit between consumer expectation and trademark
owner.  The winning bidder could be a forfeiting mark owner willing to pay
more to warehouse the mark than the losing bidder will pay to use the mark.
312 Named for Nobel laureate William Vickrey, who described the virtue of the second-
price sealed-bid auction for simplifying bid strategy.  William Vickrey, Counterspeculation,
Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FINANCE 8, 14–20 (1961); see also DIXIT &
NALEBUFF, supra note 302, at 305–11.
313 See Kesten, supra note 260, at 55 (citing KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263, at
12).
314 See id. at 62.
315 See id. at 60.
316 Id. at 61–62.
317 See KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS, supra note 263; Eric Maskin & John Riley, Asymmetric Auc-
tions, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 413 (2000) (showing that sealed bidding tends to favor weaker
bidders).
318 One could make an even more draconian move to cabin arbitrage, with losing bid-
ders forfeiting the bond.  But that would discourage even well-motivated bidders if the
bond amount is more than nominal.
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Or the winning bidder could instead be a short-term profiteer willing to
trade on consumer confusion.  The next Section thus offers a refinement
that will further discourage arbitrage and increase the likelihood that the
winning bidder will meet consumer expectations.
C. Tailoring the Auction to Benefit Consumers
The auction mechanism proposed is not designed to prevent appropria-
tion of marks with residual goodwill.  In fact, appropriation can benefit con-
sumers when the appropriator is transparent about its relationship to the
former mark owner and its efforts to meet consumer expectations.  Forfei-
ture mechanisms do not currently require such an approach, but a recent
case hints at the type of appropriation the auction mechanism aims to
encourage.
Food blogger Christian Ziebarth recently sought to relaunch Naugles, a
popular Southern California taqueria that was swallowed up in a merger with
Del Taco.319  The last Naugles restaurant shuttered in 1995—a fairly clear-cut
case of abandonment.320
Ziebarth engaged in consumer-satisfying behavior that the proposed
auction is designed to encourage.  Ziebarth’s relaunch tapped into a ground-
swell of nostalgia for the old Naugles with pop-up restaurants and a retooled
menu that fans claimed captured the essence of classic Naugles recipes.321
In comparison, Del Taco sold Naugles hats and shirts, and customers could
order from a secret Naugles menu at Del Taco restaurants.322  But Del Taco
did little else to meet consumer demand.
Ziebarth successfully petitioned to cancel Del Taco’s registration for
Naugles.323  As in previous cases, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
ignored arguments about residual goodwill.324  Fortunately, Ziebarth was the
party better suited to meet consumer expectations.325  The abandonment
mechanism is not optimized to reach that outcome.  But correctly structured,
an auction could encourage investments in infrastructure, trade secrets, and
communication with consumers when a firm wants to adopt a mark with
residual goodwill.
The auction mechanism will directly assess whether each bidder can pro-
vide consumers with a marked product consistent with their expectations.
To that end, each bidder will receive a “suitability bump”—a credit to the bid
319 Ziebarth v. Del Taco, LLC, Cancellation No. 92053501, at *6 (T.T.A.B. 2015).
320 As held by the T.T.A.B. Id. at *14.
321 See, e.g., Gustavo Arellano, The Naugles Pop-Up Was Even Awesomer than Expected—And
More to Come, OC WEEKLY (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.ocweekly.com/restaurants/the-
naugles-pop-up-was-even-awesomer-than-expected-and-more-to-come-6610279.
322 Ziebarth, Cancellation No. 92053501, at *4.
323 Id. at *14.
324 Id. at *12–13 (“The Board has never found residual goodwill to be a defense to
abandonment, and we decline to do so here.  The continued existence of enthusiasts of
the old Naugles food items does not negate the statutory presumption of abandonment.”).
325 Id. at *8.
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amount and the payment made as winning bidder—commensurate with the
bidder’s investment in infrastructure, resources, and relationships that
increase the likelihood that the bidder can meet consumer expectations.
The suitability bump is not the only option: a buyer willing to precommit to
actions that would benefit consumers might receive a discount on the price
necessary to secure the mark, or a favorable position compared to buyers
unwilling to make the same commitments.  Or the agency running the auc-
tion could use precommitments as part of an initial screening mechanism.
In any case, these investments signal in part the bidder’s valuation of residual
consumer goodwill.
Like the bid itself, these investments disclose the bidder’s estimate about
residual consumer goodwill.  In fact, these investments might be a better sig-
nal than a simple cash outlay, because they disclose valuation made prior to
the start of the auction.326  But these investments do more than disclose valu-
ation of residual goodwill.  They also indicate fit between marked product
and consumer expectation.  An auction that includes a suitability bump
encourages an appropriator to send credible signals that it is trying to meet
consumer demand as part of the trademark acquisition process.
Here’s how a suitability bump would work: Two firms bid for a forfeited
mark.  Firm A bids $10,000.  Firm B bids $10,100.  But Firm A has purchased
machinery used by the former mark owner to produce mark-bearing goods.
The auction manager concludes the purchase of the machinery qualifies for
a suitability bump of $1,000.  Firm A wins the bid with an effective bid of
$11,000.  When calculating the auction price, the winning bidder can sub-
tract the amount of the investment (the same $1,000) from the price paid to
Firm B.  In this example, Firm A pays Firm B the value of Firm B’s bid,
$10,100, less $1000, or $9,100.
Seen another way, the suitability bump encourages the investment in the
infrastructure and resources that would establish an assignment with good-
will, rather than assignment in gross.  This outcome would be preferable to
the current invitation to free ride on residual consumer goodwill to the likely
detriment of consumers and competitors.  In addition, the investment in
infrastructure is a costly signal of fit between consumer expectation and pro-
ducer output.327
326 Cf. Chiang, supra note 154 (discussing the benefit of moving disclosure mechanisms
early in the patent acquisition process).  Similar investments insulate a transfer of trade-
mark rights from an accusation of assignment in gross.  See supra notes 122–123 and
accompanying text.
327 A trademark serves a similar function: the creation of trademark meaning is also a
costly signal about consistent quality. See Mark Bartholomew, Making a Mark in the Internet
Economy: A Trademark Analysis of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 179, 203 (2005)
(“Today, brand development requires an intense commitment of resources.  For a trade-
mark to serve as an effective signal to consumers, a mark holder must not only attract
public attention, but also infuse the brand with the information and values inherent in the
product.” (footnotes omitted)).  On signaling more generally, see Shahar J. Dilbary,
Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 605, 622 (2007).  Signaling function is not the dominant justification for trademark
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Valuing investments in infrastructure would not be a costless undertak-
ing for the USPTO.  However, courts make similar appraisals in other con-
texts.  For example, in an appraisal action after a merger,328 the Delaware
Court of Chancery must often determine the value of shares held by share-
holders who disagree with the buyout price.329  Valuation in appraisal cases
could provide a model for how to value infrastructure investments in forfei-
ture cases.
One might also imagine that if only one party has acquired resources
designed to better meet consumer expectations, that party should win the
auction.  But that is not necessarily the case for at least two reasons.  First,
price is also a signal of a private party’s valuation.  Second, a well-capitalized
party may be better able to meet consumer expectations, even if that party
has not (yet) invested in relevant resources.  Thus, the auction mechanism
will reward resource acquisition by way of the suitability bump, but will not
treat the presence or absence of those investments as dispositive.
CONCLUSION
Forfeiture mechanisms serve an important role in a market for trade-
marked products.  The current operation of these mechanisms, however,
leaves much to be desired.  Trademark forfeiture mechanisms cannot fully
meet the ostensible goal of trademark protection—transmitting information
to consumers that reduces search costs, encourages mark owners to maintain
quality, and preserves a proper functioning market—if those mechanisms
ignore evidence of residual consumer goodwill.  Accounting for consumer
welfare requires a more careful look at how consumers contribute to and are
affected by the creation and termination of trademark meaning.
In some abandonment cases, we find happy accidents where the party
acquiring a forfeited mark has invested in trade secrets or recipes (like the
protection. See Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 35, at 799 (“[A]lternative justifica-
tions [like the signaling function] should not distract the reader from a proper focus on
search costs.”).  Trademarks may nevertheless have a similar signaling function to advertis-
ing. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECONOMICS 488, 499–500 (1970) (suggesting that, without trademarks, the
market for goods in which experience characteristics predominate would not be clear).
328 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2016).
329 See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 548 (Del. Ch. 2014) (in a statu-
tory appraisal proceeding, “[t]he central ‘issue is the determination of the value of the
[dissenting shareholders’] shares on the date of the merger’” (quoting Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del. 1988))).
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relaunch of Naugles), key machinery,330 or relationships with former suppli-
ers.331  Consumers would benefit if these exceptions became the rule.
Readjusting forfeiture mechanisms is part of an overarching project
aimed at ensuring trademark law takes into account not only mark owner
claims, but also consumer welfare and consumer perception.332  Indeed, the
law cannot properly define the scope of the trademark right without an
inquiry into consumer perception because consumer use justifies and con-
strains the mark’s proper scope.
330 Leaf Brands purchased the Astro Pops mark for candy from Spangler Candy, but
did not acquire any candy-making machinery; Spangler sold that for scrap after it ceased
production.  Leaf’s CEO Ellia Kassoff reverse engineered the manufacturing process until
he was satisfied that he could produce Astro Pop candy like he enjoyed in his youth. See
Planet Money Episode 652: The Hydrox Resurrection, NPR (Sept. 18, 2015), http://
www.NPR.org/sections/money/2015/09/18/441546748/episode-652-the-hydrox-resurrec-
tion (describing Kassoff’s purchase of the Astro Pop trademark).
331 Leaf Brands took a different approach with Hydrox cookies, successfully petitioning
to cancel the registration of Hydrox for cookies, and scrupulously endeavoring to reverse
engineer the original Hydrox recipe and contact original suppliers for vanilla and cocoa.
See id.
332 See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 29, at 113–16 (applying theories of
semantic shift to argue that generic terms should be allowed to obtain trademark protec-
tion when there is sufficient evidence that consumers primarily perceive the term as a
trademark); Linford, Fanciful?, supra note 28 (arguing against broad protection for fanci-
ful trademarks that convey product qualities through sound symbolism—a direct link
between sound and meaning); Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 28, at 1391–1401 (argu-
ing that consumer use of metaphor and metonym suggest the legal difference between
descriptive and suggestive trademarks are overstated); Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note
20, at 708 (arguing that trademark rights depend on effectively communicating with con-
sumers and competitors); Jake Linford, Placebo Marks (2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (arguing that advertising and branding, often seen as manipulative of
and harmful to consumers, may also convey benefits like the performance-enhancing pla-
cebo effect conveyed by the use of products associated with high-performance
trademarks).
 870 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
TABLE 2: DECISION CHART FOR DISTINGUISHING CONSUMERS HARMED BY THE
USE OF THE APPROPRIATED MARK FROM THOSE WHO ARE
UNHARMED.
Y ? Y ? N ? N ? Y ? Y ? Y ? Harmed 
consumer: 
Harm = ?*? 
where ? = 
frequency / 
duration of 
mistaken 
experience 
with good, 
and ? = the 
reduction in 
utility of the 
marked good 
compared 
with 
replacement 
goods. 
1. Did the 
mark 
influence 
the 
purchasing 
decision? 
2. Did the 
consumer 
think 
marked 
goods 
come from 
Source 1 
or expect 
goods to 
resemble 
those from 
Source 1? 
3. Are 
the 
marked 
goods 
the 
same as 
goods 
from 
Source 
1? 
4. Is the 
consumer 
happy with 
the 
marked 
goods, i.e., 
are 
marked 
goods 
fungible 
with goods 
from 
Source 1? 
5. Did the use 
of the 
trademark 
impose some 
cost / create 
some delay in 
shifting to a 
replacement 
good? 
6. Did the 
consumer 
buy or use 
the marked 
goods 
repeatedly? 
7. Is marked 
good of 
lower quality 
/ higher 
price than 
replacement 
goods? 
N ? N ? Y ? Y ? N ? N ? N ? 
Unharmed consumer 
